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Introduction
The fact that humans are at their core social beings who need and thrive on the inter-
action with others has received increasing attention during the last two decades. The
neoclassical model that had evolved during the 20th century propagated the concept
of a homo oeconomicus who is assumed to be rational, selfish, and derives utility only
from own consumption. This representation of human nature has been challenged in re-
cent years. Research in behavioral economics has provided compelling evidence, largely
based on experiments, for the existence of social preferences. Social preferences entail
that an agent’s utility does not only depend on his or her own outcomes but also on
outcomes and behaviors of others. These social preferences have been essential in ex-
plaining various important behaviors that standard preferences had so far not been able
to account for, such as helping behavior or the provision of public goods (Becker, 1974;
Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
This thesis presents and discusses four different economic experiments investigating
the foundations and formation of social preferences. Chapter 1, Chapter 3, and Chapter
4 all take a closer look at prosociality. Prosociality is one manifestation of a social prefer-
ence and refers to behavior or intentions that benefit others. Chapter 1 investigates help-
ing behavior in a non-monetary domain and asks to which extent individuals’ decisions
are guided by the consumption preferences of the receiving party and to which degree by
their own. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 both analyze the dynamics of prosocial behavior and
investigate if and under which circumstances initial prosocial behavior, in particular al-
truistic giving, increases future prosocial behavior and, therefore, how the development
of prosociality can be fostered. Chapter 2 takes the notion of social preferences to an-
other domain: risk. We investigate whether an individual prefers risky prospects that
lead to the same outcomes for her as for another individual to risky prospects that re-
sult in negatively correlated outcomes for the two individuals; we also discuss possible
reasons and implications.
Chapter 11 investigates how people assess the utility of others when making deci-
1This chapter is joint work with Thomas Neuber.
| 2
sions about providing costly help to others. Do they apply their own preferences or do
they adopt the preferences of the other person? We study this question in a laboratory
experiment where subjects in the role of senders can pay money to avoid harm arising to
receivers. In a first step, we elicit all subjects’ willingness to pay (WTP) for not having to
eat food items containing dried insects. We then show senders the WTPs of receivers and
repeat the elicitation procedure, but now with receivers having to eat the food items and
senders stating their WTPs to spare the receivers from having to eat them. We find that
not only receivers’ preferences matter for decisions but also senders’ own preferences,
a phenomenon for which we use the term imperfect empathy. In motivating prosocial
transfers, senders’ and receivers’ WTPs act as complements by reinforcing each other.
Conversely, pairs of sender and receiver who are dissimilar generate lower transfers than
others. Since transfers usually benefit receivers more than they cost senders, we also
find that dissimilarity within pairs reduces welfare. Our results complement the exten-
sive literature on prosocial preferences, which so far abstracts from heterogeneous val-
uations. The implications might be far-reaching. For example, systematic differences
in consumption preferences between net payers and recipients could undermine public
support for public welfare systems.
Chapter 22 studies if people have preferences over the interpersonal correlation be-
tween uncertain outcomes. In our laboratory experiment, 69% of subjects show a pref-
erence for positively correlated risky outcomes, whereas only 31% prefer negatively cor-
related risky outcomes. As we predict, women choose the option with positively cor-
related outcomes significantly more often than men. This finding might contribute to
our understanding of important behavioral differences between men and women, e.g.,
regarding investment in specialized human capital.
In Chapter 33, we present a long-term laboratory experiment that aims to shed light
on the development of prosocial behavior. More specifically, we investigate the effects of
an environment that stimulates prosocial behavior on subsequent levels of prosociality.
We hypothesize a positive effect on later prosocial behavior, which should go along with
an increase in reported altruistic preferences. However, we find a negative effect of the
intervention on subsequent prosociality, and no adjustment of altruistic preferences. We
discuss possible interpretations of the results and implications for future research.
Chapter 44 presents a study that is tightly linked to the study described in Chapter
3. It studies the effect of observability on the dynamics of prosocial behavior. We hy-
pothesize a twofold positive effect. First, people should act more prosocially when being
observed. Second, this increased level of prosociality should motivate an ongoing ele-
2This chapter is joint work with Anke Becker and Frederik Schwerter.
3This chapter is joint work with Frederik Schwerter.
4This chapter is joint work with Louis Strang.
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vated altruistic attitude, in accordance with the concept of altruistic capital formation.
We test our predictions running two variants of a laboratory experiment in which sub-
jects make a first donation decision either observed or anonymously. Subsequently, all
subjects face a second anonymous donation decision. In general, we observe high rates
of altruistic behavior. However, we find only weak positive effects of observability on
first-stage prosocial behavior and no effects on second-stage prosocial behavior.
In its four chapters, this thesis sheds some new light on the nature of social prefer-
ences and on their development at the level of the individual. I believe that both aspects
to which I contribute are crucial for understanding economic decision making and hu-
man behavior in general. I am also confident that deepening our understanding of social
preferences can be of great help in using their many benefits, for the individual as well as
for society at large.
References
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Chapter 1
Motivated by Others’ Preferences? An
Experiment on Imperfect Empathy1
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form
no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we
ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us
of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own
person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of
what are his sensations.
—ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS2
1.1 Introduction
It is widely documented that people consider others when making decisions: they do-
nate to charities, give blood, or volunteer. These behaviors have often been attributed
to social preferences such as altruism (Becker, 1974, 1976), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990),
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), or reciprocity
(Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). All of
these models have in common that the payoff of others is explicitly incorporated into
an agent’s utility function. Since we are often interested in the distribution of mone-
tary payoffs, the assumption that people know what is good for others is very plausible.
But—given that preferences on goods are not homogeneous—the question arises how
1This chapter is joint work with Thomas Neuber.
2Smith, 1859, Part I, Section I, Chapter I.
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these other persons’ hedonic benefits, which are not experienced by the agent herself,
are transformed into motives for personal prosocial behavior. It has been claimed that
empathy, the ability to feel into others’ emotions, is playing a central role. According
to the empathy–altruism hypothesis, altruistic motivation arises from empathy felt for a
person in need (Batson, 1987) and it has been shown empirically that induced empathy
indeed increases prosocial behavior (Coke et al., 1978; Klimecki et al., 2016) and coopera-
tion (Batson and Moran, 1999). However, the ability to sympathize with others’ emotions
is limited. We find evidence that people behave imperfectly empathic: they judge conse-
quences for others not only by the utility that the other person attaches to it, but also by
their own preferences.
In this chapter, we show that in order to make a monetary transfer to help another
person receive a specific good, two requirements have to be fulfilled: first, the receiver
of the good needs to show a preference for the transferred good and second, the sender
needs to have a preference for the good as well. This means that people do not only
care about the utility that a prosocial action entails for the other person but also which
utility they themselves attach to it. We call this type of behavior imperfect empathy (see
also Bisin and Verdier, 2001), since people do not only use the other person’s preferences
to evaluate their actions’ consequences on them (perfectly empathic behavior) but also
take into account their own preferences.
We run a laboratory experiment in which participants can make prosocial monetary
transfers to help other participants. The aim is to find out to which degree people are
guided by their own rather than by the receivers’ preferences when acting prosocially.
Since our interest lies in the emotional accessibility of others’ sensations, we use an ex-
perimental setup that cleanly isolates such experiences. Following Ambuehl (2017), we
let subjects make choices about eating food items that might provoke feelings of dis-
gust, namely dried insects and worms.3 These “bads” have several important and useful
features. First, people have preferences about the consumption of such items. Second,
disgust markedly varies between individuals and across items. Third, rational arguments
have no power in arguing what is “more disgusting” among the items, e.g., a cricket or
a worm. And fourth, we ask people to eat the items and thereby have tight control over
consumption.
In Part 1 of the experiment, participants decide how much money between e0 and
e20 they themselves would be willing to spend to avoid having to eat several different
dried insects. They can decide between receiving a lower payoff and not eating the insect
or receiving a high payoff and eating the insect. In Part 2, participants receive informa-
tion on how much eight other subjects (receivers) would each be willing to pay to avoid
3The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Bonn (reference number: 174/18).
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the insects in the first part. The participants (as senders) then decide how much money
betweene0 ande20 they would be willing to spend on sparing these other subjects from
having to eat the dried insects. They can decide between receiving a lower payoff and the
receiving subject not having to eat the insect or receiving a high payoff and the receiv-
ing subject having to eat the insect. We show that not only the receiver’s willingness to
pay (WTP) for avoiding an item has a positive effect on the respective transfer but also
the sender’s own WTP, and—in particular—the interaction of the two. Calculating the
distance between the vectors of subjects’ WTPs, we can also show that dissimilarity be-
tween senders and receivers decreases expected transfers. Defining welfare as the sum
of individual utility from personal consumption, we can further show that dissimilarity
reduces welfare. In the last part of the experiment, subjects have the option to alter deci-
sions, which others have made for themselves, which gives us a measure of paternalism.
We show that imperfect empathy is prevalent among both libertarians and paternalists.
This chapter makes contributions to the literature on the role of empathy in gener-
ating prosocial behavior. It confirms the hypothesis that empathy is a driver of proso-
cial behavior, where a lack of empathy can decrease the extent of prosocial actions and
lead to misallocation of help from the receiving party’s perspective. Our results also in-
form models featuring altruism in conjunction with heterogeneous preferences like they
are present in the literature on the intergenerational transmission of preferences (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017). Our finding could furthermore be an ad-
ditional explanation for in-group–out-group bias that might exist, e.g., along the lines
of political affiliation (see Fowler and Kam, 2007). While this bias might even exist be-
tween groups defined by attributes that are arbitrary (Tajfel et al., 1971), it could also
be that people have more similar preferences amongst their in-groups. In this case, im-
perfect empathy could explain why prosocial behavior is stronger towards members of
in-groups than towards members of out-groups. Imperfect empathy is also in line with
the literature on the false consensus effect (Ross, 1977), a bias in which people com-
monly think that their own preferences and choices are relatively more common than
other preferences and other choices. A potential implication of imperfect empathy is
that heterogeneous preferences reduce the support for redistribution and lower expected
welfare. It could therefore be an explanation for the finding that diversity has a negative
effect on redistribution and donations (Dahlberg et al., 2012; Andreoni et al., 2016) and
is therefore meaningful from a policy perspective in ever more diverse societies.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents a simple
theoretical framework and derives our hypotheses. Section 1.3 describes the laboratory
experiment. Section 1.4 presents the results on the aggregate level, on the level of in-
dividuals, and distinguishing between libertarians and paternalists. Finally, Section 1.5
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summarizes and discusses the results.
1.2 Theory and Hypotheses
We develop a simple theoretical model in which agents derive utility from own consump-
tion as well as from another person’s consumption. When evaluating the other person’s
consumption, agents use a combination of their own and of the other person’s prefer-
ences. We use the model to formally derive our hypotheses regarding imperfectly em-
pathic behavior and the consequences arising from dissimilar preferences for the size of
transfers and for overall welfare.
Individual i experiences utility from good xi and disutility from “bad” yi ; individ-
ual j experiences utility from good x j and disutility from bad y j . Utilities and disutil-
ities are evaluated by utility functions u and v that are specific to the combinations of
individuals and domains. In computing overall utility, consumption value from goods
enters additively, while disutility from bad experiences is subtracted. We use money as
the numéraire. Therefore, utility from money is simply given by the particular nominal
amount of currency.4 If no consumption takes place, we assume that utility is zero. In-
dividuals receive utility not only from their own consumption but also from the other
person’s consumption. The total utility of subject i is given by the following expression:
Ui
(
xi , yi ; x j , y j
)= ui (xi )− vi (yi )+α(u j (x j )βui (x j )1−β− v j (y j )β vi (y j )1−β) (1.1)
The first part of overall utility, ui (xi )−vi
(
yi
)
, is utility and disutility derived from i ’s own
consumption. The remaining term is the utility that individual i derives from the other
individual j ’s consumption. The general extent to which i cares about j is determined
by her level of altruism α. When evaluating j ’s utility in a particular domain, i partially
relies on both her own relevant utility function and on j ’s utility function in the respective
domain. The degree of reliance on j ’s preferences is captured by the empathy parameter
β ∈ [0,1]. If β is zero, i simply projects her own preferences upon j . If β is one, she fully
adopts j ’s preferences and disregards her own.
The notation can of course be extended to further consumption items. We assume
in the model above that subjective valuations are complements in generating vicarious
(dis-)utility by modeling them multiplicatively, while other authors have assumed per-
fect substitutability (see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Our assumption means that, in
order to enjoy someone else’s consumption, both the sender and the receiver have to at-
tach utility to the consumed good, or—conversely—they both have to attach disutility to
4We later test the assumption of linear utility from money in our context.
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a particular experience to feel that it is bad. Complementarity of assessments gives rise
to additional predictions for our experiment, which we develop below and later also test.
Transfer Decisions
We now apply the utility function in Equation 1.1 to decisions about prosocial transfers
in our experiment. In the experiment, subjects receive money, which corresponds to
good x above, and potentially eat food items, corresponding to bad y . A sender can
decide between making a monetary transfer and a receiver not having to eat a food item,
and not making a monetary transfer and a receiver having to eat a food item. Sender i
never has to consume any food item herself, i.e., vi
(
yi
)= 0, and receiver j always gets a
monetary payoff of e20, i.e., u j
(
x j
) = ui (x j ) = 20. The sender can now decide to make
a monetary transfer t ∈ [0,20] so that the receiver does not have to consume item k ∈ K .
If the potential transfer of t ∈ [0,20] (we abstract from discreteness of choice options)
for item k is accepted by the sender, the implied monetary payoff for herself is given
by xi = 20− t and the receiver does not have to eat, i.e., v j
(
y j
) = 0 and also vi (y j ) = 0.
If she rejects, her payoff is xi = 20 and the receiver has to eat item k, i.e., y j = k. For a
transfer to be made, it has to hold that the utility for the sender when making the transfer
(expression on the left hand side of the equation below) is as least as high as the utility
when not making the transfer (expression on the right hand side).
20− t +α20≥ 20+α
(
20− v j (k)β vi (k)1−β
)
The highest proposed transfer that a sender still accepts, t? (later simply transfer), is
therefore given by
t? =αv j (k)β vi (k)1−β (1.2)
Our key hypothesis about decision making can now be formulated directly in terms
of the model parameter β.
Hypothesis 1.1. People typically exhibit imperfect empathy: transfer decisions depend not
only on receivers’ preferences but also on senders’ own preferences. Formally, β ∈ (0,1).
The above hypothesis can directly be tested by estimating the parameter β on the in-
dividual level. Moreover, if the hypothesis was true, the partial derivatives of t? with
respect to both agents’ valuations would be positive, as would be the cross partial deriva-
tive. This prediction thus lends itself to reduced-form testing on the level of the subject
population, using OLS. We expect transfers to depend positively on both the respective
sender’s and the receiver’s valuations, and—in particular—on their interaction.
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Welfare
In the next step, we theoretically derive predictions about the effect of dissimilarity in
preferences between senders and receivers on the size of transfers and on overall wel-
fare. The welfare criterion that we employ is simply the sum of individual utilities from
personal consumption.
Welfare≡ ui (xi )− vi
(
yi
)+u j (x j )− v j (y j ) (1.3)
We predict dissimilarity to decrease welfare through two channels: the size of trans-
fers and the targeting of transfers. The first channel is based on the premise that trans-
fers are on average too low from a planner’s perspective. This simply follows from the
fact that the planner weighs individuals’ welfare equally, while people usually care more
about themselves than about others, i.e., α is smaller than one. As we show below, dis-
similarity in preferences further decreases the size of transfers and thereby amplifies the
welfare loss.
To understand the effect of dissimilarity on the size of transfers, consider two sub-
jects, i and j , behaving in accordance with our model and sharing the same parameter
values for α and β. We denote their respective individual valuations of some item by
vi (k) ≡ vi and v j (k) ≡ v j , and we fix the total level of the two subjects’ valuations of
items such that vi + v j ≡ v¯ . Both subjects are with equal probability of 1/2 either sender
or receiver. We further assume that vi ≥ v j . This allows us to express the valuations of
subjects in terms of the total valuation of both subjects and the distance between the in-
dividual valuations: vi = v¯+|vi−v j |2 and v j =
v¯−|vi−v j |
2 . Plugging into Equation 1.2, we can
calculate the expected maximum transfer that this pair of subjects generates.
E
[
t?
]= α
4
[(
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣)β (v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣)1−β+ (v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣)β (v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣)1−β] (1.4)
Note that, if we had assumed that vi ≤ v j , Equation 1.4 would be identical. During the
derivation, only the order of the two summands would reverse. The assumption about
which individual has the higher valuation is thus without loss of generality, as follows
from the symmetry of the setup.
The expected maximum transfer given by Equation 1.4 is visualized by Figure 1.1 for
α = 1/2 and v¯ = 20. Along the x-axis of the graph, we vary the parameter β, going from
a situation where both people fully project their own preferences (β = 0) to one where
they fully adopt others’ preferences (β = 1). On the z-axis, we vary the difference be-
tween both subjects’ valuations, holding constant the total of the two. The graph starts
at the maximum of 20 and ends at a distance of zero, i.e., a situation where both val-
uations are the same. On the y-axis, the resulting expected maximum transfer E
[
t?
]
is
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Figure 1.1: Similarity and expected transfers
depicted. If β is either zero or one, the expected transfer is always at its maximum value
of 5. The same is always the case when the two subjects’ valuations coincide. Thus, if we
were only talking about money, the degree of empathy would not have any effect on ex-
pected transfers, because there would not exist any heterogeneity in valuations. This is,
however, only a special case. If, as we expect, β typically lies in the interior of the interval
from zero to one, dissimilarity in preferences strictly decreases expected transfers, which
is our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.2. Transfers decrease with the dissimilarity of preferences within pairs of
senders and receivers. Formally, ∂E
[
t?
]
/∂
∣∣vi (k)− v j (k)∣∣< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A
The second channel through which dissimilarity in preferences decreases welfare is
saying that—conditional on a given total amount of transfers that a subject is making—
senders give for the wrong items. In the extreme case of β= 0, a sender might be willing
to spend a positive amount when the receiver has no problem with eating the respective
food item at all, while she gives nothing in case of an item that the receiver finds repul-
sive. More generally, values of β that are smaller than one open up a wedge between
how the sender evaluates consequences for the receiver and how the receiver himself—
and consequently the social planner—evaluates them. This wedge becomes increasingly
relevant as valuations of senders and receivers diverge, leading to misallocation of trans-
fers.5 We thus arrive at the following hypothesis.
5A subtle refinement of the above point would be to consider vicarious experiences—i.e. the sender’s
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Hypothesis 1.3. The expected net welfare gain from transfer decisions decreases in the
dissimilarity of preferences within pairs of senders and receivers. Formally,
∂E
[
net welfare gain
]
/∂
∣∣vi (k)− v j (k)∣∣< 0.
To summarize, we expect that senders base their transfer decisions partially on their
own valuations, where the latter and the receiver’s own valuation are complements in
motivating senders to help. This leads transfers to be on average lower for pairs of senders
and receivers who are more dissimilar than others. Reduced transfers and misallocation
of existing transfers together lead to welfare losses, which again are larger when subjects
are dissimilar.
1.3 Experiment
We conducted the experiment at the BonnEconLab in August, September, and Decem-
ber 2018. Subjects were recruited using the software hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and a total
of 146 participated. In the invitation email, subjects were asked not to sign up for the
experiment in case they were vegetarian, followed a special diet due to health, ethical or
religious reasons, or had any food allergy. For details on the composition of our sample
of subjects, see the summary statistics in Appendix 1.B. For translated verbal and writ-
ten instructions, see Appendix 1.C. Before starting the computerized zTree experiment
(Fischbacher, 2007), subjects were informed that they might be asked to eat several types
of insects during the experiment. They were then shown a tray with all eight different
food items (one buffalo worm, five buffalo worms, one meal worm, ten meal worms, one
cricket, one grasshopper, three grasshoppers, and one granola bar containing buffalo
worms; see Appendix 1.D for pictures of all food items). Furthermore, they received in-
formation about the food items’ nutritional innocuousness and each participant signed
a form of consent.
The experiment consisted of four parts. Subjects received a fixed show-up fee, which
was set to be either e5 or e7 for everybody participating in the respective session.6 In
addition, subjects were informed that a single decision among all four parts of the ex-
periment would be randomly chosen for implementation and paid at the end of the ex-
periment. All parts were kept as similar to each other as possible. Always, subjects were
endowed withe20 and then used multiple price lists (MPLs) in steps ofe1 ranging from
feelings when considering consequences for the receiver—as part of welfare. This would reduce the power
of the argument about misallocation but not dismiss it. With imperfect empathy and heterogeneous pref-
erences, there always exists a wedge between vicarious valuations and valuations by people themselves,
leading to misallocation.
6We varied the show-up fee between sessions in order to test our assumption that utility is linear in
money.
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e1 to e20 to make payments off this amount. Appendix 1.E includes screenshots of the
decision screens of all four parts.
In Part 1, we employed separate MPLs to elicit subjects’ reservation prices for not
having to eat any of the eight food items. Subjects saw one screen per item (see Figure
1.8 for an example of a decision screen). On each screen, subjects saw an informative
stimuli picture of the respective item on the left and a list of choices in the middle of the
screen. The list of choices was made up of 20 rows; each row containing the choice be-
tween a payment (going from e1 up to e20) and eating the food item. Subjects had to
indicate their choice for one of the two options for each row; a unique switching point
was enforced. The order in which the eight items were shown was randomized between
subjects. In case Part 1 was selected for implementation at the end of the experiment,
one of the 160 rows (20 rows each for eight items) was randomly drawn for implemen-
tation. If the subject had chosen to pay the amount indicated in the specific row, she
received her show-up fee as well as e20 minus the amount indicated in the row as pay-
ment. She did then not have to eat the item. If the subject had chosen to eat the item,
she received the show-up fee as well ase20 as payment. She furthermore had to eat the
item. Subjects who indicated that they would eat the item and refused to do so at the end
of the experiment only received their show-up fee.
In Part 2, subjects took the role of a sender who had the option to pay for a receiver
not having to eat a food item. The decision screens were kept very similar to the ones in
Part 1 and again contained the same respective stimuli pictures on the left hand side of
the MPLs (see Figure 1.9 for an example of a decision screen). On the right side of the
screen, subjects additionally saw the WTPs for all eight items that the relevant receiver
himself had reported in Part 1. Again, each subject saw eight screens—one for each item.
The eight decisions were each made for a different receiver. Receivers were sampled
from the pool of subjects taking part in the same session and each participant appeared
as a receiver at least once to allow for potential implementations of a decision in this
part. However, receivers were sampled in such a way that heterogeneity of WTPs between
senders and receivers was larger than in the population of subjects.7 The assignment of
receivers to food items was done without any further sophistication. As in Part 1, subjects
had to indicate for each row of the choice list if they chose the payment or the insect. In
case Part 2 was selected for implementation at the end of the experiment, one of the
160 rows was randomly drawn for implementation. If the sender had chosen to pay the
7Receivers were sequentially sampled among subjects in the same experimental session. For each sender,
we made eight independent draws pertaining to a specific criterion, and found the remaining subject who
came closest to the respective point. During four sessions, the criterion was the Euclidean distance towards
the potential sender’s vector of WTPs. In five sessions, it was a vector of WTPs. Note that identification with
senders fixed effects—or on the level of the individual sender—uses only variation in WTPs among receivers
of a given sender. The latter variation is the result of simple random matching with fixed, equal probabilities.
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amount indicated in the specific row, she received her show-up fee as well ase20 minus
the amount indicated in the row as payment. The receiver of the row did then not have
to eat the item and received his show-up fee and e20. If the sender had chosen not to
pay, she received the show-up fee as well as e20 as payment. The receiver furthermore
had to eat the item and received his show-up fee and e20. Receivers who refused to eat
the item even though their senders had indicated that they would not pay only received
their show-up fee.
Part 3 elicited subjects’ general level of altruism in the domain of money in a way that
mimicked the other parts of the experiment as closely as possible (see Figure 1.10 for an
example of a decision screen). As a default, receivers got an amount that was less than
e20, mirroring a situation where they had to eat a food item for which they have a certain
willingness to pay, and senders could decide whether they wanted to pay amounts from
e1 and e20 to secure the receiver e20 instead of e15, e10, e5, or e0. The order of
amounts was again randomized. Since we do not need data from Part 3 for identification
and hence are not using them, we will not go into more detail here.
Finally, in Part 4, subjects were again shown the same eight receivers as in Part 2. This
time, however, they did not decide about engaging in helping behavior but had the op-
tion to alter receivers’ self-regarding choices from Part 1 without any consequences for
themselves. Decision screens looked almost the same as the ones from Part 2 and con-
tained the stimuli picture on the left, the MPL in the middle, and the list of the receiver’s
WTPs from Part 1 on the right (see Figure 1.11 for an example of a decision screen). How-
ever, the MPL already contained the choices that the respective receiver had marked for
himself in Part 1. In case Part 4 was selected for payment at the end of the experiment,
one of the 160 rows was randomly drawn for implementation for the receiver. If the
sender had chosen the payment indicated in the specific row, the receiver received his
show-up fee as well as e20 minus the amount indicated in the row as payment. The re-
ceiver did then not have to eat the item. If the sender had chosen the item, the receiver
received the show-up fee as well ase20 as payment. He furthermore had to eat the item.
Receivers who refused to eat the item even though the other subject had not chosen the
payment only received their show-up fee.
After all subjects had made their decisions, they were ultimately matched to unilat-
eral pairs of senders and receivers for whom a payoff was implemented. For each subject,
a single decision was drawn to be paid out. If Part 1 was implemented for the sender, Part
4 was implemented for the receiver. If Parts 2 or 3 were implemented for the sender, the
respective part was also implemented for the receiver. After answering a final survey on
the Big Five traits (Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005) and the items of the Interpersonal Reactiv-
ity Index, which measures empathy (Davis, 1980), subjects—if necessary—ate their food
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items and then received their payoffs. If subjects did not comply and refused to eat their
food items, they were penalized by only receiving the show-up fee.
1.4 Results
We start our empirical analysis by estimating the determinants of transfers on the aggre-
gate level by pooling decisions from all individuals. We then proceed by estimating the
relationship for each individual separately and recovering individual structural parame-
ters. Next, we turn to the welfare implications by first looking at the effect of dissimilarity
on the size of transfers and then directly on net welfare gains. Finally, we show the per-
vasiveness of imperfect empathy separately among libertarian and paternalist subjects.
Transfer Decisions
In Part 1, participants spend on average e6.57 per item to avoid eating it; 78% of them
have a positive WTP for some item. In Part 2, senders spend on averagee3.44 per item to
spare receivers from eating it; 75% of senders have a positive WTP for some item–receiver
combination. Appendix 1.B shows histograms of WTPs for all items separately for Part 1
and Part 2.
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Note: Panel (a) shows the average size of transfers made for a receiver in Part 2 for every possible WTP of the
receiving subject in Part 1. Panel (b) again shows the average size of transfers made for a receiver in Part 2,
this time for every possible WTP of the sending subject in Part 1. The lines show fits from OLS estimations,
and shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals for standard errors that are clustered at the subject
level. Both positive relationships are significant at the 1% level.
Figure 1.2: Individual willingness to pay (WTP) and average transfers
Figure 1.2 visualizes how transfers towards receivers in Part 2 depend on the WTPs of
receivers and senders from Part 1. Figure 1.2a shows the average size of transfers made
for a receiver in Part 2 for every possible WTP of the receiving subject from Part 1. The
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higher the receiver’s WTP, the higher is the average transfer made towards him. The pos-
itive relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 1.2b shows the average
size of transfers made for a receiver in Part 2 for every possible WTP of the sending sub-
ject from Part 1. The higher the sender’s WTP, the higher is the average transfer made
towards the receiver. Again, the positive relationship is significant at the 1% level.
To test Hypothesis 1.1, we regress the maximum transfer accepted in Part 2, t?, on
the receiver’s willingness to pay WTPreceiver elicited in Part 1 as well as on the sender’s
willingness to pay WTPsender, also elicited in Part 1. Column 1 Table 1.1 shows the results
Dependent variable: Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Receiver’s WTP 0.308∗∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0311) (0.0364) (0.0300) (0.0354) (0.0359)
Sender’s WTP 0.252∗∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗∗ 0.0627 -0.0156 -0.0578
(0.0345) (0.0466) (0.0394) (0.0582) (0.0576)
p
Sender’s× receiver’s WTP 0.381∗∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗∗
(0.0646) (0.0693) (0.0702)
Sender fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Receiver fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Item fixed effects No No No No Yes
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168
Clusters 146 146 146 146 146
(Within-)R2 0.362 0.197 0.417 0.285 0.171
Note: OLS regression; standard errors are clustered for senders; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.1: Aggregate analysis of transfers
without any fixed effects. We see that both WTPs, of the receiver and the sender, enter
with large and highly significant coefficients, which in fact are not so different in size. An
increase ofe1 in the WTP of the receiver increases the transfer on average bye0.31, while
the same increase in the sender’s WTP increases the average transfer bye0.25. A poten-
tial concern could be that senders might differ in their general levels of altruism, and that
this variation is systematically related to their own WTPs. Moreover, particular patterns
in receivers’ WTPs could trigger responses of senders, irrespective of the particular item
in question. To rule out such problems, Column 2 adds sender and receiver fixed effects.
Due to sender fixed effects, identification only comes from differences in WTPs between
receivers of a given sender and from variation in this sender’s WTPs across items. Re-
ceiver fixed effects allow to account, e.g., for some receivers having generally low WTPs
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and receiving low transfers, irrespective of the particular item and the respective sender.
The coefficient for the receiver remains almost unchanged, while the coefficient refer-
ring to the WTP of the sender somewhat decreases. The latter points to some degree of
“spillovers” in empathy: e.g., a sender who feels strong disgust for worms might also bet-
ter understand why somebody would strongly dislike eating a grasshopper, even if the
grasshopper itself does not seem repulsive for the sender. Despite the proximity of pref-
erence domains that we use, variation in preferences within individuals is sufficient to
show that there is a strong and significant effect of senders’ WTPs on transfers. In Col-
umn 3, the square root of the product of the sender’s and the receiver’s WTP is added to
the regression without fixed effects.8 The coefficient of the receiver’s WTP drops by half
but is still highly significant, whereas the coefficient of the sender’s WTP is not signifi-
cantly different from zero anymore. However, the interaction term enters with a large
and highly significant coefficient. This confirms that WTPs of receivers and senders act
as complements in generating transfers. Column 4 again adds sender and receiver fixed
effects. In Column 5, we additionally add fixed effects for the eight different food items,
accounting for differences in the general levels of transfers. In both Columns 4 and 5,
coefficients stay similar and the qualitative results remain unchanged.
We show below in Section 1.4 that the above qualitative results also hold within sub-
samples of the subject populations where senders are restricted to only libertarians or
paternalists, respectively. Our empirical results are also insensitive to the size of the
show-up fee (see Appendix 1.F), and the assumption of utility from money being linear
in the relevant range thus seems innocent. Overall, we find clear support for Hypothesis
1.1. We interpret this as evidence that imperfect empathy is a pervasive phenomenon
among our subject population.
Individual-Level Analysis
In the next step, we analyze behavior at the level of individuals and recover estimates for
the model parameters. To do so, we first linearize Equation 1.2 for the size of transfers by
taking the logarithm on both sides.
ln
(
t?
)= ln(α)+β ln[v j (k)]+ (1−β) ln[vi (k)] (1.5)
We estimate Equation 1.5 separately for each individual subject. Note that all quantities
except the parameters in the equation are directly observed in our experimental data.
ln
(
t?
)
is the logarithm of the maximum transfer accepted in Part 2, ln
[
v j (k)
]
equals the
logarithm of the receiver’s willingness to pay WTPreceiver elicited in Part 1, and ln[vi (k)]
8This corresponds to a proposed value of β= 1/2
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is the logarithm of the sender’s willingness to pay WTPsender elicited in Part 1.
9 We thus
estimate the following linear equation.
ln
(
t?
)= γ0+γ1 ln(WTPreceiver)+ (1−γ1) ln(WTPsender)+² (1.6)
The estimates for the general level of altruism are given by αˆ = exp(γˆ0) and those for
empathy by βˆ= γˆ1.
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Note: The figure shows estimated parameter values for α and β. Only
those subjects entered the analysis who made varying choices within
Part 1 and Part 2. In addition, six subjects were excluded due to implau-
sible parameter estimates and three further subjects were excluded due
to large standard deviations of the parameter estimates, leaving 71 ob-
servations.
Figure 1.3: Estimates for individual parameters
Figure 1.3 shows parameter estimates for β on the horizontal axis and α on the ver-
tical axis. Variation in senders’ WTPs and transfers in principle allows us to identify pa-
rameters for 80 subjects, of whom we get reasonable estimates for 71. Among the latter,
the vast majority of subjects is assigned estimates that lie inside the ranges of expected
values from zero to one. We see large heterogeneity in parameter estimates, and the
variation in estimates for β indicates that the effects that we find in the analysis on the
aggregate level are not only driven by a small number of subjects. Moreover, the figure
shows that, for any given level of general altruism, there exists marked heterogeneity in
the empathy parameter. The two thus appear to be distinct characteristics of the indi-
viduals.
9To avoid missing values at zero, we add 0.1 to all WTPs and transfers.
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Welfare
We now turn to study the welfare implications of the decisions that were observed in the
experiment. To test Hypothesis 1.2, we regress transfers on two different measures of
dissimilarity between sender and receiver. We define partial dissimilarity as the absolute
difference between sender i ’s and receiver j ’s WTP regarding the relevant item k, divided
by its maximum of 20.
Partial dissimilarityi j k =
∣∣WTPi k −WTP j k ∣∣
20
Total dissimilarity is the Euclidean distance between the full vectors of sender i ’s and
receiver j ’s WTPs for all items k, again divided by its potential maximum value.
Total dissimilarityi j =
√∑8
k=1
(
WTPi k −WTP j k
)2
20
p
8
Dependent variable: Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partial dissimilarity -4.156∗∗∗∗ -4.046∗∗∗∗ -3.724∗∗∗∗
(0.718) (0.728) (0.718)
Total dissimilarity -4.244∗∗∗∗ -4.393∗∗∗∗ -0.652
(0.970) (0.973) (0.789)
Receiver’s WTP 0.378∗∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0428) (0.0418)
Sender’s WTP 0.285∗∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0442) (0.0447)
Receiver’s average WTP 0.393∗∗∗∗
(0.0419)
Sender’s average WTP 0.310∗∗∗∗
(0.0470)
Sender fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Receiver fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Item fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168
Clusters 146 146 146 146 146
(Within-)R2 0.429 0.305 0.208 0.0773 0.208
Note: OLS regression; standard errors are clustered for senders; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.2: Similarity and transfers
Table 1.2 shows the results. Column 1 and Column 3 use partial dissimilarity, while
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Column 2 and Column 4 use total dissimilarity. Columns 1 and 2 present the baseline
results without any fixed effects. Column 1 uses the receiver’s and the sender’s WTP to
control for level effects. The effect of partial dissimilarity is thus conditional on both
parties’ own valuations, and it shows that dissimilarity decreases the size of transfers.
In Column 2, level effects are correspondingly controlled for by using the receiver’s and
the sender’s average WTP, because total similarity also refers to all items. Total dissim-
ilarity enters negatively and with a similar effect size as partial dissimilarity in Column
1. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the previous two with fixed effects for senders, receivers,
and items, making controls for average WTPs redundant. The effects of dissimilarity re-
main almost unchanged. In Column 5, regressors from the previous two columns are
combined. Total dissimilarity has no significant effect beyond the effect through partial
dissimilarity, which is line with Hypothesis 1.2. Interestingly, this means that senders
descriptively discriminate against receivers whose preferences are different but only be-
cause of imperfect empathy and not because they generally dislike them.
To test Hypothesis 1.3, we first need to derive the welfare consequences of deci-
sions over any proposed transfer level t . The net welfare gain from no transfer is—by
definition—zero. If the proposed transfer (i.e. the row on the decision screen) is ac-
cepted, the net welfare gain can be calculated according to Equation 1.3. If a transfer
of t is made, welfare is given by 20− t +20. If the transfer is not made, welfare is given
by 20+20− v j (k), where the latter valuation corresponds to the WTP of the receiver. For
any proposed transfer (a row in the MPL), the welfare impact can thus be calculated as
follows.
Net welfare gain≡
WTPreceiver− t if transfer of t is made0 if transfer of t is not made
By the design of the MPLs used in the experiment, the probability of a transfer being
made for a given item and receiver is the maximum size of the transfer, t?, divided by
the number of rows, which is 20. If a transfer is made, the receiver experiences a wel-
fare gain equivalent to his corresponding WTP. The sender loses the transfer amount of
the respective row. We can thus calculate the expected net welfare gain of any transfer
decision made by senders as follows.
E
[
net welfare gain
]= t?
20︸︷︷︸
P (transfer made)
(
WTPreceiver− t
?+1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
E [transfer | transfer made]
)
Table 1.3 shows the results of regressing the expected net welfare gain on partial dissim-
ilarity or total dissimilarity. Columns correspond to the ones in Table 1.2. Columns 1 and
2 present the baseline results without any fixed effects. Column 1 uses the receiver’s and
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Dependent variable: E
[
net welfare gain
]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Partial dissimilarity -2.648∗∗∗∗ -2.460∗∗∗∗ -2.398∗∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.370) (0.378)
Total dissimilarity -2.490∗∗∗∗ -2.484∗∗∗∗ -0.126
(0.481) (0.504) (0.352)
Receiver’s WTP 0.270∗∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0224) (0.0224)
Sender’s WTP 0.0878∗∗∗∗ 0.0805∗∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0186)
Receiver’s average WTP 0.267∗∗∗∗
(0.0214)
Sender’s average WTP 0.0915∗∗∗∗
(0.0204)
Sender fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Receiver fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Item fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1168 1168 1168 1168 1168
Clusters 146 146 146 146 146
(Within-)R2 0.536 0.331 0.397 0.0665 0.397
Note: OLS regression; standard errors are clustered for senders; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.3: Similarity and welfare
the sender’s WTPs to control for level effects. We find that partial dissimilarity decreases
the expected net welfare gain. In Column 2, level effects are controlled for by using the
receiver’s and the sender’s average WTP. Total dissimilarity also enters negatively, with a
magnitude that is comparable to that of partial dissimilarity. Columns 3 and 4 replicate
the previous two columns with fixed effects for senders, receivers, and items. The es-
timated effects remain stable. Column 5 combines the regressors from Columns 3 and
4, showing that the effect of total dissimilarity is entirely driven by the effect of partial
dissimilarity regarding the relevant item. Thus, Hypothesis 1.3 is confirmed. Moreover,
we again find no evidence for taste-based discrimination against receivers with different
preferences.
Libertarians vs. Paternalists
Since we have shown that people partially rely on their own preferences in choosing the
level to which they provide others with help, it is natural to ask whether and how this
might be related to paternalistic behavior: if people are not willing to support choices
that seem strange to them, they might also want to change them. Nevertheless, imperfect
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empathy and paternalism are different concepts. First, imperfect empathy pertains to a
certain kind of preferences, whereas paternalism is a certain kind of behavior. Second,
the ranges of relevant applications of both phenomena might overlap (see, e.g., Jacobs-
son et al., 2007) but are not identical: imperfect empathy is relevant in many situations
where restricting others’ freedom is not even an option; and paternalism occurs in many
contexts where empathy is not relevant but is often driven by, e.g., asymmetric informa-
tion. Third, it is not clear whether people who make helping behavior depend on their
own valuations regard the latter as normatively warranted or would rather—if they were
aware of it—object to such behavior and therefore also not want to restrict others’ free-
dom.
To study the relationship between imperfect empathy and paternalism empirically,
we use subjects’ choices from Part 4 to classify them as paternalists or libertarians. A
subject is only classified as a libertarian if she abstained from altering any other subjects’
decisions. All subjects that altered any decision are classified as paternalists. According
to this definition, we end up with 74 libertarian subjects and 72 paternalists.
Dependent variable: Transfer
Libertarians Paternalists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Receiver’s WTP 0.412∗∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.0482) (0.0528) (0.0554) (0.0583) (0.0356) (0.0386) (0.0315) (0.0428)
Sender’s WTP 0.238∗∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.0283 -0.0434 0.251∗∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.127∗ 0.0862
(0.0451) (0.0574) (0.0470) (0.0792) (0.0550) (0.0657) (0.0669) (0.0808)
p
Sender’s× receiver’s WTP 0.442∗∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗
(0.0894) (0.0979) (0.0888) (0.0964)
Sender fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Receiver fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 592 569 592 569 576 558 576 558
Clusters 74 74 74 74 72 72 72 72
(Within-)R2 0.451 0.269 0.516 0.357 0.267 0.142 0.291 0.177
Note: OLS regression; standard errors are clustered for senders; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns with fixed effects include fewer observations than
others because some receivers were only matched to a single paternalist or libertarian sender, respectively.
Table 1.4: Libertarians vs. paternalists
Table 1.4 replicates our main results on transfer decisions from the first four columns
of Table 1.1 separately for libertarians in Columns 1–4 and paternalists in Columns 5–8.
Comparing Columns 1 and 2 with Columns 5 and 6, respectively, we see that the role
of senders’ WTPs is slightly weaker among libertarians as compared to paternalists, al-
though the differences in coefficients are not statistically significant. This is plausible
since paternalists are subjects that are less willing to accept others’ choices and it is there-
fore not surprising that they react less to receivers’ WTPs. More importantly, the effect
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of senders’ WTPs enters with considerable magnitude and high statistical significance
within both subsamples. Proceeding towards the comparison of Columns 3 and 4 with
Columns 7 and 8, it turns out that the effect of the interactions between senders’ and
receivers’ WTPs in fact tends to be stronger among libertarians than among paternalists.
The latter finding also alleviates concerns about measurement error driving our results,
i.e., about senders trying to “correct” receivers’ choices. While the interpretation of WTPs
as noisy signals about true valuations would not be able to explain the asymmetry of our
results in the first place—i.e., the complementarity of valuations—it would also be in-
compatible with senders not intervening in other subjects’ own decisions: senders care
about receivers—they make transfers—and if they thought others were making mistakes,
they should save them from doing so. In contrast, in our experiment, even people who
put faith in others’ personal judgments and who do not show any signs of paternalism
exhibit imperfect empathy.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that people behave imperfectly empathic when acting proso-
cially. They assess consequences arising to others based on a combination of their own
and the other persons’ preferences. In particular, own and others’ valuations act as com-
plements in bringing about helping behavior. We show that this property of imperfect
empathy leads to the effect that dissimilar preferences lower the size of transfers as well
as overall welfare.
We hereby confirm the hypothesis that empathy plays a role in generating prosocial
behavior and furthermore show that a lack of it can lead to lower—according to a ba-
sic libertarian welfare criterion—and poorly aimed helping behavior. Our results also
inform models featuring altruism in conjunction with heterogeneous preferences. How-
ever, the mechanism of imperfect empathy is not only relevant for individual behaviors
such as charitable giving or volunteering. It also allows for an alternative perspective on
the phenomenon of in-group bias. We observe that transfers are lower if other people
have overall different preferences. Within our experiment, however, this effect is entirely
driven by imperfect empathy and not by a dislike against subjects who are different. Im-
perfect empathy might also have implications on the aggregate level for the working of
welfare states. If people cannot relate to the consumption choices made by recipients of
welfare benefits, this could decrease the willingness to finance such redistributive poli-
cies. An implication for policy might be that exposure to individuals with different sets
of preferences, e.g. due to cultural or religious backgrounds, could be central for the po-
litical sustainability of welfare states in increasingly diverse societies.
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1.A Proof of Hypothesis 1.2
The partial derivative of expected transfers given by Equation 1.4 with respect the dis-
tance between subjects’ valuations is negative whenever β lies in the open interval from
zero to one and the distance between individual valuations is larger than one. Valuations
are denoted by vi , v j > 0 and v¯ = vi + v j denotes the total of both valuations.
Proof.
∂E
[
t?
]
∂
∣∣vi − v j ∣∣ = α4
[
β
(
v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)1−β
− (1−β)( v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)β
−β
(
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)1−β
+ (1−β)( v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)β]
= α
4
{
β
[( v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1]
)1−β
−
(
v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)−(1−β)]
+ (1−β)
( v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)β
−
(
v¯ − ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
v¯ + ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣
)−β}
< 0 if β ∈ (0,1)∧
∣∣vi − v j ∣∣> 0
= 0 if β ∈ {0,1}∨ ∣∣vi − v j ∣∣= 0
1.B Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Observations
Female 0.500 0 1 0.502 146
Age 25.630 18 69 7.741 146
Partial distance 0.416 0 1 0.386 1168
Total distance 0.493 0 1 0.281 1168
Table 1.5: Summary statistics
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of the WTPs for the eight food items of all subjects who acted as
senders in Part 2. Shown are the decisions they made for themselves in Part 1.
Figure 1.4: Senders’ willingness to pay (Part 1)
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Figure 1.5: Receivers’ willingness to pay (sampled from Part 1)
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Figure 1.6: Transfers (Part 2)
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1.C Instructions
Verbal Instructions
“Welcome to today’s experiment! Before we start, we would like to provide you with some
information.
In this experiment, you will, under specific circumstances, eat dried and non-living in-
sects (or food containing dried insects) that were farmed in the European Union for the
consumption of humans. We will give you information on the specific insects and we will
also show them to you. We will now come to your cubicles and show you a tray with the
insects and the food containing insects. We will furthermore distribute written informa-
tion on the nutritional values of the insects and forms of consent. Please read everything
carefully and sign the forms of consent; we will afterwards collect the written informa-
tion and one of the forms. You can keep the other form of consent as a copy. As soon as
you have read and signed everything, please hold up your hand to let us know you are
ready.
The insects that you are seeing now are crickets, grasshoppers, meal worms, and buffalo
worms. You are furthermore seeing a cereal bar containing buffalo worms. You can also
touch the insects and the bar carefully. All of these insects were farmed in the European
Union for human consumption. They have been certified as food and are completely
innocuous for your health; on the contrary, insects are typically very healthy.
Please close your curtains now; we will start the experiment."
2. Welcome and Introduction
Welcome!
For participating in this experiment, you and all other present participants will receive
a payment of e5/e7. All further payments, which will depend on your decisions during
this experiment, will be added.
Today’s study is made up of four parts. You will make decisions that can influence your
payment or the payment of another participant in all four parts. At the same time, other
participants will make decisions that can in turn influence your payment.
At the end of the experiment, with a probability of 50%, one of your own decisions will
be implemented. All single decisions that you make during the course of the experiment
will be paid out with equal probability.
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With a probability of 50%, a decision another person has made for you will be imple-
mented. All single decisions that a participant took for somebody else will be imple-
mented with equal probability.
Please raise your hand if you have questions at any time. One of the experimenters will
then come to you.
Please click “Continue” to start the experiment.
3. Instructions Part 1
For Part 1 of this study, you receive a payment of e20. In the following, we would like to
know which amount of thesee20 you would be willing to pay in order to not eat a specific
insect. For every insect or food item containting insects that were shown to you at the
beginning of the study you will in the following see a list of decisions of the following
form:
Option Payment: you pay ex and do not have to eat the insect – Option Insect: you eat
the insect
For each of these decisions, you have to decide between the option Payment and the
option Insect.
In case one of the decisions is implemented at the end of the experiment and you chose
option Payment, you receive e20 minus the amount that was indicated in the descrip-
tion and you do not have to eat. In case you chose option Insect for the chosen decision,
you will have to eat the insect before payment and receivee20 without deduction.
Important: in case you choose option Insect and–contrary to your decision–refuse to
eat the insect, you will receive a penalty ofe20 and receivee0.
If you understood everything, please click “Continue” in order to continue with the ex-
periment.
4. Decision Screen Part 1 (see Screenshot in Figure 1.8)
5. Instructions Part 2
Thank you for finishing Part 1. You are now starting Part 2.
For Part 2 of this study, you receive a payment of e20. In the following we would like
to know which amount of these e20 you would be willing to pay in order for another
participant of this experiment not having to eat a specific insect. For every insect or
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food containing insects that were shown to you at the beginning of the study you will in
the following see a list of decisions of the following form:
Option Payment: you pay ex and the other person does not have to eat the insect –
Option Insect: the other person has to eat the insect
You are making the decision for eight other participants that are all taking part in this
study at this moment. At the same time, other participants who are also taking part in
this study at this moment are making the same decision for you. Before you make your
decision for the other participant, you will receive information on how much money this
participant was maximally willing to pay for not having to eat the insect in Part 1.
For every decision, you have to decide between option Payment and option Insect.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of your decisions for somebody else is being
implemented, the following will happen: if you chose option Payment for the chosen
decision, you receive e20 minus the amount that was indicated in the description and
the other participant does not have to eat. If you chose option Insect for the decision,
the other participant has to eat the insect before payment and you receive e20 without
deduction.
Important: in case you choose option Insect and–contrary to your decision–the other
person refuses to eat the insect, the other person will receive a penalty of e20 and
receivee0. You will receivee20.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of the decisions another participant has
made for you is being implemented, the following will happen: if the other participant
chose option Payment, you will receivee20 and you will not have to eat the insect. If the
other participant chose option Insect, you will have to eat the insect before payment and
you will receivee20.
Important: in case the other participant chose option Insect and–contrary to his or her
indication–you refuse to eat the insect, you will receive a penalty of e20 and receive
e0.
If you understood everything, please click “Continue” in order to continue with the ex-
periment.
6. Decision Screen Part 2 (see Screenshot in Figure 1.9)
7. Instructions Part 3
Thank you for finishing Part 2. You are now starting Part 3.
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For Part 3 of this study, you receive a payment of e20. In the following, we would like
to know which amount of these e20 you would be willing to pay in order for another
participant of this experiment to receive a higher payoff. In the following, you will see a
list of decisions of the following form:
Option Payment: you pay ex and the other person receives e20 – Option No Payment:
the other person receivese0/e5/e10/e15
For every decision, you have to decide between option Payment and option No Payment.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of your decisions for somebody else is being
implemented, the following will happen: if you chose option Payment for the chosen
decision, you receive e20 minus the amount that was indicated in the description and
the other participant receives e20. If you chose option No Payment for the decision,
the other participant receives the respective lower payment and you receivee20 without
deduction.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of the decisions another participant has
made for you is being implemented, the following will happen: if the other participant
chose option Payment, you will receive e20. If the other participant chose option No
Payment, you will receive the respective lower amount.
If you understood everything, please click “Continue” in order to continue with the ex-
periment.
8. Decision Screen Part 3 (see Screenshot Figure 1.10)
10. Instructions Part 4
Thank you for finishing Part 3. You are now starting Part 4.
In the following we would like to know if you would change the decisions from Part 1 of
another participant.
As a reminder: in Part 1, every participant decided how much he or she would be willing
to pay maximally in order not to eat a specific insect. Every participant saw one list of
decisions per insect of the following form and had to decide between option Payment
and option Insect.
Option Payment: you pay ex and do not have to eat the insect – Option Insect: you eat
the insect
You will now see the lists of eight participants that are all participating in this study at
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this moment and their decisions. You can change the decisions of the participants as
you want.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of your decisions for somebody else is being
selected, this decision will be implemented for the other person. If option Payment was
chosen, the other participant receives e20 minus the amount that was indicated in the
description and does not have to eat. If option Insect was chosen, the other participant
has to eat the insect before payment and receivese20 without deduction.
Important: in case option Insect was chosen and–contrary to the decision–the other
person refuses to eat the insect, the other person will receive a penalty ofe20 and will
receivee0.
In case that at the end of the experiment one of the decisions another participant has
made for you is being implemented, the following will happen: if option Payment was
chosen, you receive e20 minus the amount that was indicated in the description and
you do not have to eat the insect. If option Insect was chosen, you have to eat the insect
before payment and you receivee20.
Important: in case option Insect was chosen and–contrary to the decision–you refuse
to eat the insect, you will receive a penalty ofe20 and receivee0.
If you understood everything, please click “Continue” in order to continue with the ex-
periment.
9. Decision Screen Part 4 (see Screenshot in Figure 1.11)
11. Questionnaire
Thank you for finishing Part 1 to Part 4.
In the following we are asking you to answer some questions.
After you have answered all questions, the experiment is over.
How old are you?
What is your gender?
How high is your monthly income (after taxes and before all expenses)?
In the following, we are interested in how much you are willing to take on risks. Please
state your evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “not at all willing to take on risks”
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and 10 means “very willing to take on risks”. You can grade your evaluation with the
values in between.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
We are now asking you for your willingness to behave a certain way. Please state your
evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “not at all willing to do this” and 10 means
“very willing to do this”. You can grade your evaluation with the values in between.
How much are you willing to forego something that carries utility for you in order to
benefit from it in the future?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To what extent would you be willing to punish someone who has treated you unfairly
even though this has negative consequences for you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To what extent would you be willing to punish someone who has treated somebody else
unfairly even though this has negative consequences for you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To what extent would you be willing to donate to a good cause without expecting some-
thing in return?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Please think about how you would act in the following situation. You are in an unknown
area und notice that you got lost. You are asking a stranger for the way. The stranger
offers to accompany you to your destination.
Helping you costs the stranger approximately e20. However, the stranger says that he
does not want money from you. You have six gifts with you. The cheapest gift costs e5,
the most expensive gift costse30. Would you offer the stranger one of the gifts as a thank
you?
Yes/No
Which gift would you give to the stranger?
The gift worthe5
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The gift worthe10
The gift worthe15
The gift worthe20
The gift worthe25
The gift worthe30
I don’t know
Imagine the following situation: today, you received an unexpectede1.000.
How much of the money would you donate to a good cause? Donation:
Here are different characteristics a person can have. Probably, some of the characteristics
will apply to you personally, whereas others do not. For some, you may be undecided.
Please use the following scale to answer: value 1 means “does not apply at all” and value
7 means “applies very much”. With the values between 1 and 7, you can grade your eval-
uation.
I see myself as someone, who. . .
- is a reliable worker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is talkative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is sometimes rude to others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is original, comes up with new ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- worries a lot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- has a forgiving nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- tends to be lazy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is outgoing, sociable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- values artistic, aesthetic experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- gets nervous easily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- does things efficiently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is considerate and kind to almost everyone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- has an active imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is relaxed, handles stress well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please indicate for each of the following statements to which extent it applies to you
personally. Please state your evaluation on a scale from 1 to 5. A 1 means "describes me
very well" and a 5 means "does not describe me well". You can grade your evaluations
with the values in between.
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- I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to
me.
- I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
- I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy’s" point of view.
- Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
- I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
- In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
- I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don’t often get com-
pletely caught up in it.
- I try to look at everybody’s side of disagreement before I make a decision.
- When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards
them.
- I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.
- I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective.
- Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
- When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
- Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
- If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other
people’s arguments.
- After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
- Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
- When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity
for them.
- I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.
- I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
- I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
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- I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
- When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading
character.
- I tend to lose control during emergencies.
- When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
- When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
events in the story were happening to me.
- When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
- Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their
place.
How did you decide how much you would be willing to pay for not having to eat an insect?
Based on which criteria did you decide how much money to pay for the other partici-
pants?
Do you have any further comments?
Thank you for your participation!
We will begin the payment shortly. Please wait on your seat until your cubicle number is
called and then come to the adjoining room to receive your payment.
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1.D Stimuli Pictures
(a) One buffalo worm (b) Five buffalo worms (c) One mealworm
(d) Ten mealworms (e) One grasshopper (f) Three grasshoppers
(g) One cricket (h) Bar of buffalo worms
Figure 1.7: Stimuli pictures of insects
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1.E Screenshots
Figure 1.8: Screenshot of Part 1
Figure 1.9: Screenshot of Part 2
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Figure 1.10: Screenshot of Part 3
Figure 1.11: Screenshot of Part 4
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1.F Robustness Regarding Income Levels
In Section 1.2, we have made the assumption that utility from money is linear, which we
have used throughout this chapter. We believe that this assumption is innocent since
we are concerned with monetary amounts in a range of e0 to e27. However, as a sim-
ple robustness exercise, we varied the fixed show-up fee that subjects received between
sessions. In four sessions, subjects received e7 and in five sessions, they received e5. If
the level of earnings during the experiment mattered for subjects’ decision making, this
should voice itself in results that differ between sessions depending on the size of the
show-up fee.
Dependent variable: Transfer
Show-up fee =e7 Show-up fee =e5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Receiver’s WTP 0.292∗∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0605) (0.0428) (0.0515) (0.0403) (0.0450) (0.0412) (0.0488)
Sender’s WTP 0.259∗∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.0808 0.0121 0.250∗∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.0433 -0.0407
(0.0590) (0.0878) (0.0645) (0.109) (0.0386) (0.0506) (0.0483) (0.0604)
p
Sender’s× receiver’s WTP 0.363∗∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗∗
(0.0933) (0.113) (0.0859) (0.0824)
Sender fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Receiver fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 528 528 528 528 640 640 640 640
Clusters 66 66 66 66 80 80 80 80
Note: OLS regression, standard errors are clustered for senders; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p <
0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.6: High show-up fee vs. low show-up fee
Table 1.6 shows the results corresponding to the ones in Table 1.1 split according to
the size of the show-up fee. Qualitative results are robust within both subsamples; all
differences in coefficients are insignificant. Differences in the income level during the
experiment therefore do not seem important for our results.
Chapter 2
Preferences Over the Interpersonal
Correlation Between Uncertain
Outcomes1
2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty is a pervasive facet of everyday life and very prevalent in economic decision
contexts. Therefore, risk preferences play a part in many economic models and have
been subject to extensive empirical investigation.
However, most models and risk measures have in common that they consider prefer-
ences over uncertain individual states in isolation, disregarding any potential uncertain
states of others. This is surprising, given that social preferences are well established in
the economic literature. In fact, situations in which people make decisions under uncer-
tainty are often connected to decisions about the correlation between individuals’ own
and others’ risky outcomes (e.g. financial investment decisions). Nevertheless, research
on preferences over the interpersonal correlation between uncertain outcomes is almost
non-existent, and—to our knowledge—even suggestive empirical evidence in which di-
rection preferences tend to go is scarce.
We seek to find out if people have a preference for positive or for negative interper-
sonal correlation between uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, we investigate if women
have stronger preferences for positively correlated uncertain outcomes than men. In
order to do so, we run a simple laboratory experiment to elicit if people prefer risky pay-
off to be positively or negatively correlated with the risky payoff of another person. In
the experiment, a subject decides between two different lotteries that both entail equal
1This chapter is joint work with Anke Becker and Frederik Schwerter.
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chances of winning and losing: a 50%–50%-lottery in which she and another subject
win at the same time or lose at the same time (positively correlated risky payoff) and a
50%–50%-lottery in which she wins if the other subject loses and vice versa (negatively
correlated risky payoff).
We find that around 69% of subjects in our laboratory experiment choose the posi-
tively correlated uncertain payoffs, whereas around 31% choose the negatively correlated
uncertain payoffs. Furthermore, women choose the positive correlation with a signifi-
cantly higher probability than men.
There are several real world situations in which preferences on the interpersonal cor-
relation between uncertain outcomes might play a role. One example concerns financial
investment decisions. If people have a preference for positively correlated uncertain out-
comes, they might invest too much in things in which others have invested already, a
phenomenon that is often observed and which is discussed in the literature about herd-
ing (Devenow and Welch, 1996; Sias, 2004).2 A particular interesting application might be
the purchasing of private homes, since houses not only constitute the main financial as-
set of many households but also determine their relevant peer group: neighbors. When
a house gains or loses in value, the same is usually also the case for surrounding houses,
and thus risky financial outcomes amongst neighbors are positively correlated. If people
value this fact, the latter might contribute to explaining the high home ownership rates
in many countries (Oswald, 1996; Chambers et al., 2009).
Another situation in which preferences on the interpersonal correlation between un-
certain outcomes might play a role is to what extent people choose jobs that require high
or low degrees of specialization. Acquiring specialized human capital can lead to higher
wages and more job-related success (Tam, 1997). However, apart from specialization be-
ing a riskier choice, at the same time, it also means that a person’s risky labor market
outcomes correlate less with the average risky labor market outcomes of others. Let us
assume that the economy consists of a set of industries that each are subject to industry-
specific shocks as well as to shared general shocks. Agents can now either be generalists,
who can work in every industry, or they can be specialists, in which case they are re-
stricted to a particular industry but also earn higher wages. Generalists are only subject
to general shocks; their risky labor market outcomes correlate positively with the average
outcome of the market. Specialists are additionally subject to the respective industry-
specific shocks; their risky labor market outcomes correlate less with the average out-
come of the market. We therefore expect that people with a preference for negatively
2In its most general form, herding can be defined as behavioral patterns that are correlated across indi-
viduals. More narrowly, it is defined as a group of investors following each other into (or out of) the same
securities over some period of time. Herding can lead to systematically erroneous decision-making by pop-
ulations and is closely linked to phenomena such as imperfect expectations and bubbles.
2.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses | 44
correlated uncertain outcomes are more likely to specialize and focus on certain areas
when acquiring human capital. Furthermore, it is commonly observed that women seek
less specialization than men. This finding is, amongst others, used to explain the gender
wage gap (Tam, 1997).
In our experiment, we additionally elicit school grades in order to compute a tractable
though potentially simplistic measure for specialization. We analyze if the gender differ-
ence in preferences over the correlation between uncertain outcomes can explain why
women specialize less than men. Indeed, we find that women in our sample specialize
slightly less than men. However, this effect is not explained by the difference in prefer-
ences over uncertain outcomes, and, overall, we do not find a robust correlation between
preferences over the interpersonal correlation between uncertain outcomes and special-
ization.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we summarize the relevant literature
and present theoretical considerations as well as the resulting hypotheses. In Section
2.3, we describe the experimental design. In Section 2.4, we present the results before
arriving at our discussion along with concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Decisions under uncertainty and risk preferences are widely studied areas in economics.
Starting out with the expected utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
the framework has been extended and modified by introducing subjective probabilities
(Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963), risk aversion (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1974)
and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), to name just a few of the most influen-
tial contributions. Apart from these theoretical models, extensive empirical research has
been conducted and various methods to measure risk preferences and estimate utility
functions have been developed (see Charness et al. (2013) for an overview).
As mentioned before, all of these models have in common that they only consider
individual risk, disregarding the risk that other people face at the same time. However,
there exists a theoretical branch of literature on the evolutionary development of pref-
erences that analyzes the evolutionary advantages and disadvantages of correlated vs.
uncorrelated risky outcomes. The conclusion that is commonly drawn based on various
models is that, given that risks are the same from an individual point of view, positively
correlated uncertain outcomes are a greater danger for the survival of a population than
uncorrelated uncertain outcomes (e.g. Cooper and Kaplan, 1982; Robson, 1996; Curry,
2001). Thus, groups of individuals choosing negative correlations between individual
outcomes tend to have higher levels of evolutionary fitness than groups who do the op-
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posite, and one could expect the former preference to have prevailed. Indeed, it has been
shown that different correlations between outcomes can shape economic preferences
with persistent consequences (Galor and Savitskiy, 2018).
However, there also exist several motives for choosing the positively correlated un-
certain outcomes. These reasons include, amongst others, inequity aversion and social
support. Positively correlated risky outcomes typically mean that payoffs for people are
the same or at least similar, whereas negatively correlated risky outcomes mean differ-
ent payoffs. Inequity aversion, or fairness preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), could
therefore lead people to choose the positively correlated outcomes. Furthermore, it has
been shown that people have a desire to share their emotions with others during difficult
life events, but also during happy times as is described in the social support literature
(see for example Kaplan et al. (1977)). A motive for avoiding negatively correlated risky
payoffs could therefore be that people prefer to have social support and someone with
whom to share the experience of the gain or the loss.
Since theoretical economic arguments do not, in sum, deliver a clear prediction for
whether people should be expected to choose one option or the other in our experimen-
tal setup, the main part of our experiment is of an exploratory nature. Our main aim is
to find out which preferences people have over the interpersonal correlation between
uncertain outcomes.
Research Question. Which proportions of people prefer a positive or a negative interper-
sonal correlation between uncertain outcomes?
Conditional on finding some heterogeneity in people’s preferences, meaning that
motives differ in their strength across people, we would expect a gender difference. From
past research, we know that women have more egalitarian preferences than men (Fehr
et al., 2006). Furthermore, women are more likely to look for social support from oth-
ers and also provide it more often (Flaherty and Richman, 1989; Belle, 1991). Since we
consider these behaviors to be indicators for preferences for positively correlated risky
outcomes, we expect women to choose the positively correlated risky outcomes more
often than men, which is formulated in Hypothesis 2.1.
Hypothesis 2.1. Women choose the positively correlated uncertain payoffs with a higher
probability than men.
Hypothesis 2.2 concerns the relationship between preferences over the interpersonal
correlation between uncertain outcomes and the decision to acquire specialized human
capital as opposed to becoming a generalist. As elaborated in detail before, specialization
means that a person’s risky labor market outcomes correlate less with others’ risky labor
market outcomes. We therefore hypothesize that people with a preference for negatively
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correlated uncertain outcomes are more likely to specialize and to focus on certain ar-
eas when acquiring human capital. Women commonly seek less specialized jobs than
men (Tam, 1997). We therefore expect women to be less specialized than men and hy-
pothesize that the weaker specialization of women can be partially explained by a lower
preference for negatively correlated uncertain outcomes.
Hypothesis 2.2. Subjects who choose the positively correlated uncertain outcomes are on
average less specialized. Women are less specialized than men. This gender difference in
specialization can be partially explained by women having stronger preferences for posi-
tively correlated uncertain outcomes.
2.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
We conducted a laboratory experiment in December 2018 at the Cologne Laboratory for
Economic Research using the softwares Qualtrics and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). For every
session, 32 participants were invited. Each session lasted 15 minutes and consisted of
two parts. Participants received a fixed payoff of e5 and had the chance to earn an ad-
ditional e10. The payoff-relevant decision was made in Part 1. Instructions translated
from German can be found in Appendix 2.B.
In Part 1, subjects were told that two participants would be randomly selected at
the end of the experiment and that for these two participants, the choice from Part 1
would be implemented. One of the two selected subjects would be the active partici-
pant and one of them would be the passive participant. The additional payoff of the two
participants would be determined by a coin toss. The coin would show “heads” with a
probability of 50% and “tails” with a probability of 50%. The winning side of the passive
participant would be randomly determined by the computer before the coin toss. If the
passive participant’s winning side showed up, he would receive an additional payoff of
e10; if the losing side showed up, he would receive an additional payoff of e0. The ac-
tive participant’s winning side would be determined by herself. She could choose in Part
1 if—in case she was randomly determined to be the active participant at the end of the
experiment—she would like to have the same winning side as the passive subject or if
she would like to have the other winning side. If the active participant chose the same
winning side as the passive participant, and if this was the side that showed up during
the random coin toss, the active and the passive participant both received an additional
e10. If the other side showed up, both received an additionale0. If the active participant
chose the other winning side and this side showed up, the active participant received
an additional e10 and the passive participant e0. If the active participant’s losing side
showed up, the active participant received an additional e0 and the passive participant
2.4. Results | 47
e10. As can be seen, the individual chance of winning of the active participant did not
change with the side she chose as winning side; neither changed the chance of winning
of the passive participant. Furthermore, the total expected payoff for both participants
together stayed the same (e10), irrespective of the chosen winning side. However, if the
same side was chosen, the payoffs of the participants were positively correlated. If the
other side was chosen, then the payoffs of the participants were negatively correlated.
Subjects received two examples to further explain the setup and had to answer two con-
trol questions. In Part 1, all participants chose if they would want the same or the other
winning side in case they were later chosen to be the active participant.
In Part 2, subjects answered a questionnaire. The questionnaire included demo-
graphic questions (gender, age, field of study, income). Furthermore, we asked them
for 17 common school subjects (e.g. math or German) if they had been enrolled in this
subject during their last years of high school and which had been the last grade they had
received. We use the standard deviation between grade averages in different fields of
subjects as a measure of specialization, as we will later discuss in more detail.
2.4 Results
The 267 subjects who participated in the experiment are of an average age of 25.4 years;
58.8% of them are women. For summary histograms on all elicited variables, see Ap-
pendix 2.A.
31.09%
68.91%
Same Side Other Side
Figure 2.1: Shares of subjects choosing the same and the other side of the coin, respec-
tively
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Figure 2.1 shows the fraction of participants choosing the same and the other coin
side, respectively. We find that 68.91% of all subjects choose the same winning side
(positively correlated uncertain outcomes), which is significantly different from 50%,
which would be expected if people simply randomized (two sided binomial test, p-value
< 0.001). Furthermore, also when analyzed separately, men as well as women both choose
the positively correlated uncertain outcomes significantly more often than the negatively
correlated uncertain outcomes.
As predicted by Hypothesis 2.1, there is a gender difference of 10.5 percentage points
in choosing the positively correlated uncertain outcomes. 73.3% of women choose the
same coin side, whereas only 62.7% of men do so. Table 2.1 shows regression results con-
cerning this gender difference. In Column 1, the dummy variable "Same" (1 if the same
coin side was chosen and 0 if the other coin side was chosen) is regressed on the dummy
variable "Female" (1 if subject was female and 0 if subject was male). The difference of
10.5 percentage points is significant at a significance level of 10%.
Dep. variable: Same
(1) (2)
Female 0.105∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.0583) (0.0580)
Age 0.00781∗∗∗∗
(0.00205)
Constant 0.627∗∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0777)
Observations 267 267
R2 0.0125 0.0295
Note: OLS regression; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001; robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Table 2.1: Effect of gender and age on probability of choosing the same coin side
Since women in our sample are on average 1.5 years younger than men and since
choosing the same side is positively correlated with age (correlation coefficient of 0.119),
we additionally control for age (and thereby for the cohort) in years in Column 2. Age
enters positively and highly significantly. The coefficient of Female increases slightly and
is now significant at a significance level of 5%. The strong effect of age on choosing the
positively correlated payoffs is driven entirely by participants that are older than 35 (15
subjects in total). Of these 15 subjects, seven are women and eight are men; 14 of them
choose the positively correlated risk. It therefore seems that preferences for a positive
correlation of uncertain outcomes increase as people get older. However, since we are
running our experiment with a student sample, we do not have enough variation in our
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data to draw robust conclusions. It would be interesting to investigate the development
of the preferences on the correlation between risky payoffs over the life cycle.
We now turn to Hypothesis 2.2, which claims that men are more specialized than
women and that this gender difference can partially be explained by women having
stronger preferences for positively correlated uncertain outcomes than men. We com-
pute a proxy for a particular, potentially important decision about specialization in sub-
jects’ past: effort invested in school subjects. In Part 2 of the experiment, we ask partic-
ipants to report the last grades they received in 17 different school subjects during their
last years of high school on the German scale for school grades from 1 to 6 (whereas 1
is the best grade and 6 is the worst grade). We group all 17 school subjects into one of
four categories.3 For each participant, we then calculate the grade average for each of
these categories and use the standard deviation between those grade averages as our
measure of specialization. We decided to first group the school subjects into categories
to reduce measurement error and account for the fact that people were enrolled in dif-
ferent numbers of school subjects. Moreover, fields correspond to broad university study
areas, whereas for many academic subjects there do not exist corresponding individual
school subjects (e.g. economics is usually not taught at German high schools). People,
who are very good in one field and very bad in others (hence are specialized in one area),
score high on the variable "Specialization". In contrast, people who are similarly good in
all fields (and hence generalists), score very low on the variable. Analyzing the degree of
specialization, we exclude all participants reporting grades on a different scale than the
one that they were asked to use (1 to 6). Doing so, we end up with 202 observations.
Our measure of specialization is possibly problematic since it is not clear if a higher
standard deviation in school grades actually translates into occupations that require more
specialized human capital. We later discuss measures that might be more suitable. How-
ever, we argue that school grades and the decision on which ones to focus is an early
form of specialization. Students have limited resources (such as time, intelligence, etc.)
and have to decide in which school subjects to invest. Given that they are not bounded
at the top (their resources are insufficient to receive the top grade in all subjects; we fur-
ther assume that everybody is capable of achieving grades that at least in some subjects
are better than the bottom grade), they can decide to distribute their effort evenly across
fields, or they can decide to focus all their resources on only a few fields. Distributing re-
sources evenly leads to similar grades and therefore a low standard deviation. Focusing
on certain areas leads to good grades in these areas and to bad ones in the neglected areas
3Mathematics, Computer Science, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry are grouped into category "Natural
Science". German, English, French, Latin, Greek, and Spanish are grouped into category "Languages".
Geography, History, Religion, and Politics are grouped into category "Social Science". Sports and Art are
grouped into category "Others".
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and therefore to a high standard deviation. This early form of specialization can translate
into specialization in later life since school grades—and also the acquired knowledge be-
hind them—pave the way to apprenticeships and college degrees: when the time comes
to choose a future career, students with low specialization (generalists) still have all their
options open but are suboptimally educated for any area, whereas students with high
specialization (specialists) are already restricted to certain areas in which they are, how-
ever, better educated.
Since students with a grade average of 1 (seven observations in our sample) do not
seem to face a binding budget constraint regarding their (efficiency units of) effort and,
by construction, have a standard deviation of 0, we drop them from our sample.4 Our
remaining sample therefore consists of 195 observations.
Dep. variable: Specialization
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.146∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.112∗∗
(0.0580) (0.0527) (0.0532)
Grade Average 0.509∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.180)
Grade Average Squared -0.0620∗ -0.0630∗
(0.0345) (0.0348)
Age 0.00127
(0.00284)
Constant 0.869∗∗∗∗ -0.00935 -0.0431
(0.0488) (0.225) (0.233)
Observations 195 195 195
R2 0.0350 0.168 0.169
Note: OLS regression; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001; robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Table 2.2: Effect of gender, grade average, squared grade average, and age on specializa-
tion
Table 2.2 shows regression results analyzing if there is a gender difference in spe-
cialization in our sample. In Column 1, the variable Specialization is regressed on the
dummy variable Female. As expected, the coefficient is negative and significant at a sig-
nificance level of 5%. Women in our sample are around 16.8% less specialized than men.
However, one drawback of the variable Specialization is that grades are capped, which
mainly becomes relevant for very good students. Since many people with very good
grades have a very low standard deviation in grades, whereas few people are very bad
4Students with a grade average of 6 would also have a standard deviation of 0. However, none of our
subjects has this grade average.
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in everything (they probably would have had to repeat the year), we additionally control
for the average grade of all school subjects and the squared average grade in Column 2.
The coefficient of Female is still negative but increases slightly. Results stay almost un-
changed when additionally controlling for age in Column 3. Our findings are therefore
in line with the first part of Hypothesis 2.2.
Next, we look at the general relation between specialization and preferences over the
interpersonal correlation between uncertain outcomes. Figure 2.2 shows boxplots of the
variable Specialization, one plot for subjects who choose the negatively correlated risky
payoffs and one plot for subjects who choose the positively correlated risky payoffs. The
point estimates for the median of the distribution of specialization are slightly lower for
subjects choosing the positive correlation relative to subjects choosing the negative cor-
relation. This is in line with Hypothesis 2.2, but the effects are weak and insignificant.
The same holds when looking at the means. A Mann-Whitney U Test is also unable to re-
ject the null hypothesis of the distributions being identical in both subsamples (p-value
= 0.16).
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Note: Boxplots of variable Specialization for subjects who choose the other coin side and subjects who
choose the same coin side. The lines inside the box represent the medians, the lower and upper bounds
of the box the lower and upper quartiles, respectively. The lower and upper lines outside the box represent
the minimum and maximum values inside 1.5 times the interquartile distances, respectively. Dots outside
are outliers.
Figure 2.2: Boxplots of specialization
We now turn towards the question if the gender difference in specialization can par-
tially be explained by the gender difference in the preferences over the correlation be-
2.5. Conclusion | 52
tween uncertain outcomes. This question is analyzed in Table 2.3. Column 1 is the same
as Column 1 of Table 2.2; specialization is regressed on the dummy variable Female. In
Column 2, we additionally add the dummy variable for choice of the same side of the
coin to the regression. The variable Same does not enter significantly and the coefficient
of Female stays almost unchanged. In Column 3 and Column 4, we additionally control
for the grade average, the squared grade average, and for age. The coefficient for Same
remains insignificant. However, the point estimate becomes absolutely larger, and the
point estimate for the coefficient of Female becomes correspondingly absolutely smaller
at the same time. This is generally consistent with Hypothesis 2.2, but due to lack of
statistical power the results at this point remain inconclusive.
We can therefore not confirm Hypothesis 2.2. Women in our sample choose the pos-
itively correlated risky payoffs more often than men, and they are weakly significantly
less specialized. However, we do not find sufficient evidence for a relationship between
specialization and preferences over the correlation between uncertain outcomes.
Dep. variable: Specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.146∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.103∗
(0.0580) (0.0585) (0.0530) (0.0537)
Same -0.0770 -0.0894 -0.0940
(0.0616) (0.0562) (0.0574)
Grade Average 0.512∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.178)
Grade Average Squared -0.0620∗ -0.0636∗
(0.0341) (0.0343)
Age 0.00198
(0.00291)
Constant 0.869∗∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗∗ 0.0454 -0.00456
(0.0488) (0.0623) (0.232) (0.237)
Observations 195 195 195 195
R2 0.0350 0.0432 0.179 0.181
Note: OLS regression; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001; robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Table 2.3: Effect of gender, choosing the same coin side, grade average, squared grade
average, and age on specialization
2.5 Conclusion
We run a simple laboratory experiment to elicit preferences over the interpersonal cor-
relation between uncertain outcomes. In the experiment, subjects choose between a
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lottery in which payoffs are positively correlated with the payoffs of another subject and
a lottery in which payoffs are negatively correlated with the payoffs of another subject.
We find that around 69% of all subjects choose the positive correlation; only 31%
choose the negative correlation. We furthermore find that significantly more women
than men prefer positively correlated uncertain outcomes. Women in our sample are
also less specialized than men. However, this gender difference in specialization can-
not be explained by the gender difference in preferences over the correlation between
uncertain outcomes.
We see our study as the first step in a larger research agenda investigating prefer-
ences over the interpersonal correlation between uncertain outcomes. One next and
essential step would be to find more evidence that the decision subjects make in our
experiment reflect a stable preference. In order to do so, we suggest an experiment in
which people make similar decisions at different points in time and to test the correla-
tion between those decisions. Furthermore, it would be important to find out which role
inequity aversion plays for agents when deciding about correlated payoffs. In our exper-
iment, choosing the positively correlation also lowers inequality in payoffs between the
two agents. This could shed light on the degree to which we are dealing with a behav-
ioral primitive or a consequence of underlying preferences that are already well-known.
It would therefore be important to check if preferences over correlated risky outcomes
and inequity aversion are two independent concepts. Another step would be measur-
ing preferences over the interpersonal correlation between uncertain outcomes in more
detail and eliciting people’s willingness to pay for a positive correlation. This could be
done by offering not only a binary choice between perfectly negative and perfectly posi-
tive correlations but different correlations in between. This would also allow for a more
precise measurement of gender differences.
Our hypothesis on the relation between preferences on the interpersonal correlation
between uncertain outcomes and specialization requires more investigation. First of all,
our findings regarding the determinants of specialization could be improved immensely
and be shown more robustly by using a more precise measure of specialization. One
caveat of the measure we are employing is that it is not clear if a higher standard devia-
tion in school grades actually translates into occupations that require more specialized
human capital. When working with a student population, however, it is not clear which
other information could be used. A more robust approach could be to run the experi-
ment with a non-student population eliciting data on actual occupations and combine
this with information on which occupations require higher levels of specialization and
which ones lower levels. Alternatively, one could use data on real job specialization to-
gether with elicited school grades to find support that a higher standard deviation in
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school grades translates into more specialized occupations.
Finally, not only preferences over the interpersonal correlation between uncertain
outcomes should matter for choosing the amount of specialization, but also risk prefer-
ences themselves. In our experiment, risk is not an issue because personal risks are the
same for both lotteries between which participants choose. It would still be interesting to
see if there is some sort of correlation between preferences over the correlation between
uncertain outcomes and risk preferences in themselves. We would suggest eliciting per-
sonal risk preferences to shed more light on this question.
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2.A Summary of Variables
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Figure 2.3: Summary histograms
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2.B Instructions
Welcome!
Please turn off your phone and do not communicate with other people.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to
your place. Please stay seated quietly for the duration of the experiment in order to not
disturb anyone.
Please enter your cubicle number into the following field:
General Information
This experiment will last up to 15 minutes and is made up of two parts.
In Part 1, you will make one decision.
In Part 2, you will answer a questionnaire.
Your Compensation
You will receivee5 for your participation. Additionally, you can earn a further payoff.
Two (out of a maximum of 32) participants of this experiment will be randomly selected
by the computer at the end of the experiment.
The additional payoff of the two randomly selected participants will be determined by
Part 1. All other participants do not receive any additional compensation.
For the sake of clarity, instructions for Part 1 are formulated as if the computer had se-
lected you at the end of the experiment.
Part 1
Please read the following instructions carefully and answer the control questions.
Your Teammate
The second person that is randomly selected by the computer will be your teammate.
Coin Toss
In Part 1, your payoffs will be determined by a fair coin toss. The result of the coin toss is
“Heads” with a probability of 50% and “Tails” with a probability of 50%.
The coin toss determines if you receive e10 as an additional payoff or if you do not re-
ceive any additional payoff. You have a winning chance of 50%.
Furthermore, the coin toss determines also if your teammate receives an additional pay-
off ofe10 or if he or she does not receive any additional payoff. Your teammate also has
a winning chance of 50%.
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At the end of the experiment, after all other participants have left the laboratory, the coin
toss will be performed in front of you and your teammate by an experimenter.
Which side of the coin (“Heads” or “Tails”) will be your winning side and which side of
the coin will be your teammate’s winning side will be determined by coincidence, your
roles, and your decisions during Part 1.
Active and Passive Role
There are two roles, the active role and the passive role. The computer will randomly
determine who of you and your teammate has the active and who the passive role at the
end of the experiment.
The person with the passive role will have the winning side (“Heads” or “Tails”), which is
randomly drawn by the computer.
The person with the active role can decide her- or himself if she or he wants the same
winning side as the passive person or if she or he wants the other side.
Additional Payoff
If the active person chooses the same winning side as the passive person, the participants
either both wine10 or both win nothing.
If the active person chooses the other side as winning side, then always one of the partic-
ipants winse10 (either the active or the passive person), and the other one wins noth-
ing.
Example 1
Assume the following: you drew the active role and your teammate randomly received
the winning side “Heads”. You chose the same winning side. If the coin toss now resulted
in “Heads”, you would receive e10 and your teammate would receive e10. If the coin
toss now resulted in “Tails”, then you and your teammate would both receive nothing.
Example 2
Assume the following: you drew the active role and your teammate randomly received
the winning side “Heads”. You chose the other winning side. If the coin toss now resulted
in “Heads”, you would not receive anything and your teammate would receivee10. If the
coin toss now resulted in “Tails”, you would receive e10 and your teammate would not
receive anything.
Control Question 1
Assume the following: you drew the active role and your teammate randomly received
the winning side “Heads”. You chose the same winning side. The coin toss resulted in
“Heads”. Which answer is correct?
• You and your teammate do not receive an additional payoff.
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• You and your teammate each receive additionale10.
• You receive additionale10 and your teammate does not receive anything.
• You do not receive anything and your teammate receives additionale10.
Control Question 2
Assume the following: you drew the active role and your teammate randomly received
the winning side “Tails”. You chose the other winning side. The coin toss resulted in
“Heads”. Which answer is correct?
• You and your teammate do not receive an additional payoff.
• You and your teammate each receive additionale10.
• You receive additionale10 and your teammate does not receive anything.
• You do not receive anything and your teammate receives additionale10.
Your Decision
You can now decide if you want the same winning side as your teammate or if you want
the other winning side. Should you be randomly assigned to the active role, your decision
will be implemented.
Should you have the active role and your teammate the winning side “Heads” and you choose the same winning side,
then you and your teammate both receivee10 with “Heads” and both nothing with “Tails”.
Should you have the active role and your teammate the winning side “Tails” and you choose the same winning side, then
you and your teammate both receivee10 with “Tails” and both nothing with “Heads”.
Should you have the active role and your teammate the winning side “Heads” and you choose the other winning side,
then you do not receive anything and your teammate receivese10 with “Heads” and you receivee10 and your teammate
nothing with “Tails”.
Should you have the active role and your teammate the winning side “Tails” and you choose the other winning side,
then you do not receive anything and your teammate receives e10 with “Tails” and you receive e10 and your teammate
nothing with “Heads”.
• Same Winning Side
• Other Winning Side
Part 2
We are now starting the questionnaire.
Age (in years):
Gender:
How much money do you have available every month?
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Which subject do you study?
Please tell us for the following school subjects if you were enrolled in them during your
last years of school.
• Math
• German
• English
• French
• Latin
• Greek
• Spanish
• Geography
• Art
• History
• Sports
• Computer Science
• Physics
• Biology
• Chemistry
• Religion
• Politics/Economics/Social Science
Please tell us for every school subject that you were enrolled in during your last years of
school the last grade you received in this subject. Please tell us your grades on a scale
from 1 (best grade) to 6 (worst grade). If you do not remember exactly, please give us
your best approximation.
Chapter 3
On the Dynamics of Prosocial
Behavior1
3.1 Introduction
People often behave in ways that are not in line with behavior of the selfish, output-
maximizing homo oeconomicus: they volunteer, give money to charities, help others,
and cooperate. This type of behavior has often been attributed to social preferences,
which reflect the idea that a person’s utility depends not only on their own payoff but
also on other people’s payoffs and behaviors.2 In past research, it has been shown that
social preferences positively affect economic success (Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Becker
et al., 2012; Algan et al., 2014), and well-being (Dunn et al., 2008; Park et al., 2017) in sev-
eral contexts. Furthermore—challenging the traditional understanding of preferences as
being fixed—prosocial behavior has been found to be highly context dependent (Dana
et al., 2007; Grossman, 2014) and even sustainably malleable (Kosse et al., 2019). The
importance and malleability of prosociality naturally gives rise to questions on its devel-
opment and on how this development can be fostered.
We experimentally test a theoretical approach conceptualizing the formation of proso-
cial attitudes that goes back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle,
virtues are formed by committing virtuous acts. Based on this idea, we argue that peo-
ple’s preferences become more prosocial when these people engage in prosocial behav-
ior via the following mechanism: when people do something prosocial due to a stim-
ulating environment, they adjust their self-perception. In order to avoid cognitive dis-
1This project is joint work with Frederik Schwerter.
2Common manifestations of social preferences are altruism (Becker, 1974, 1976), inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), or warm glow (Andreoni, 1990).
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sonance, they thereafter maintain the more prosocial behavior even if there is no stim-
ulating environment anymore. We call this effect altruistic capital effect, in which the
term altruistic capital refers to the person’s prosocial self-image. We test altruistic capi-
tal formation by investigating the effect of an environment that encourages prosociality
on subsequent prosocial behavior. We hypothesize that people who act prosocially due
to such an encouraging environment behave more prosocially in subsequent situations
compared to people who were not in the same stimulating environment beforehand. We
furthermore aim to find out more about the underlying change in self-image and test for
changes in self-reported altruistic preferences.
This paper is inspired by recent theoretical literature on prosocial behavior and moral-
ity formation. Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) derive a model in which people form altruistic
capital defined as an asset that enables individuals to internalize the effect of their ac-
tions on others and makes future altruistic behavior more likely. Importantly, altruistic
capital is formed by engaging in altruistic behavior. Bénabou and Tirole (2011) offer an
underlying mechanism that can explain why assuming altruistic capital formation is sen-
sible. They develop a model in which agents gain utility from high self-esteem and make
inferences about their true moral type by observing past moral and immoral actions. The
model also comes to the conclusion that, under certain conditions, good actions build
up moral capital3 and lead to further good actions, whereas bad actions destroy moral
capital and lead to further wrongdoing.
Especially in psychology, there is an abundant amount of empirical literature inves-
tigating the formation of prosocial or moral behavior in dynamic contexts. Evidence,
however, is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, there is the Foot-in-the-Door Effect that
refers to the phenomenon that the acceptance of a small initial request leads to a more
probable acceptance of a greater subsequently made request. The effect has been em-
pirically investigated and positive evidence has been found (Freedman and Fraser, 1966).
Self-perception theory is most often used to explain it: the respondent feels helpful for
accepting the small initial request and accepts again because he or she wants to main-
tain the new self-image (DeJong, 1979; Gorassini and Olson, 1995; Burger and Caldwell,
2003). Also in line with altruistic capital formation is the broader literature on habit for-
mation in which people stick to well-pracitced behaviors (habits) because the processing
that monitors their execution has become automatic (Ouellette and Wood, 1998). Past
actions therefore have an effect on future actions, which has been shown for different
domains, for example voting (Fujiwara et al., 2016). However, even though the observed
effects are the same (performing an action in the past increases the likelihood of repeat-
3Moral capital is the term used by Bénabou and Tirole (2011) referring — in line with the term altruistic
capital that we use — to the morality of the self-image.
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ing the same action in the future), the underlying mechanism of habit formation is differ-
ent to the mechanism underlying altruistic capital formation (automatisation vs. change
of self-perception).
However, there is also evidence pointing in the opposite direction. People show
moral licensing and moral cleansing behavior (see Merritt et al. (2010) for an overview).
The term moral licensing refers to the effect that people who just did something they
consider moral behave less morally afterwards because of the previous moral action—
presumably because they feel “excused”. Moral cleansing refers to the opposite effect. It
refers to situations in which people who did something immoral show more moral be-
havior in subsequent situations because of the previous immoral action. These effects
have been found for such different domains as discrimination and racism (Monin and
Miller, 2001; Effron et al., 2009; Bradley-Geist et al., 2010; Merritt et al., 2012), environ-
mental decisions (Mazar and Zhong, 2010), and consumption of luxury goods (Khan and
Dhar, 2006).
Recently, also economists have taken interest in these phenomena and found that
prosocial behavior decreases during repeated prosocial interactions in economic setups
(Sass and Weimann, 2012; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017), but that this negative effect is weaker
the longer the time period between these actions (Schmitz, 2019). However, it has been
found empirically that the negative moral licensing effect shows when the first prosocial
action was not costly, whereas the positive altruistic capital effect prevails given that the
first prosocial action was costly and therefore actually carried a signal on the prosociality
of the participant (Gneezy et al., 2012).
But how could these opposing effects coexist? We have the following mechanism in
mind, which we explain in more detail in Section 3.3: individuals have a self-image, a cer-
tain belief about their level of prosociality, and act according to this self-image to avoid
cognitive dissonance. This leads to a “normal” level of prosociality, which stays the same
on average and comprises people’s altruistic preferences. Moral licensing and moral
cleansing effects are short term fluctuations around this natural level due to moral ac-
counting, offsetting earlier outliers. However, altruistic capital formation refers to chang-
ing the self-image and therefore the whole level of “natural” prosociality. We imagine this
effect to kick in after prosocial behavior has been abnormally high (or low) over a longer
time span, or after actions carrying strong signals (e.g. if they were very costly or ob-
served by others), which might be induced and enhanced by an environment fostering
prosocial behavior.
In order to test our hypothesis, we conduct a laboratory experiment in which partic-
ipants work on different tasks over several weeks. We vary between treatments if solv-
ing the tasks leads to prosocial charitable donations or payments for the subjects them-
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selves. In a final session, we measure subjects’ levels of prosociality via a real-effort task.
We find a weakly significant negative treatment difference in this subsequent prosociality
when controlling for self-reported altruism. Furthermore, we do not find a change in al-
truistic preferences for the treatment group. We discuss these findings—that contradict
our hypotheses—in the last part of this chapter.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2, we describe the experimental de-
sign, Section 3.3 derives our hypotheses, Section 3.4 contains the analysis and our results
and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Experiment
We ran an experiment using the infrastructure of the BonnEconLab in May, June, and
July 2016. 50 participants were invited using hroot (Bock et al., 2014); the surveys were
run using Qualtrics. The duration of the experiment was six weeks and it consisted of
ten online sessions (two per week), as well as of one final laboratory session. We re-
stricted the experiment to subjects who had never participated in an experiment of the
BonnEconLab before and were 18, 19, or 20 years old. Before starting the experiment,
participants were randomized into one of two treatment groups: the Control Treatment
(C), in which subjects completed tasks for receiving vouchers to shop for themselves at
the online store Amazon, and the Altruistic Treatment (A), in which subjects completed
tasks in order to generate donations for a good cause. All subjects were reimbursed with
a payment of e100 for participating in all eleven sessions. Missing more than one ses-
sion resulted in lower payoffs in order to avoid high attrition rates. The compensation
was paid after the last laboratory session.
During the first five weeks of the experiment, subjects received an email containing
a link to an online survey at 9 a.m. on every Monday and on every Thursday. They had
time to finish the survey until 11:59 p.m. of the respective day. Afterwards, the links lost
their validity. Subjects who did not finish the first or the second survey were excluded
from the experiment. Subjects who did not finish one of the other surveys received a
reminder email and all following survey links. The overall structure and timeline of both
treatments is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Instructions translated from German can be found
in Appendix 3.B.
In Session 1, subjects answered a short survey (S1) containing demographic ques-
tions. In Session 2, subjects answered a longer survey (S2), in which we elicited risk, time,
and social preferences, as well as life satisfaction and psychological personality measures
(Big Five (Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005)). Furthermore, subjects were asked to complete five
sets of the real-effort task Counting Zeros by Abeler et al. (2011), which was also used to
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Control Treatment:
Session:
Surveys 1+2
1 - 2
Exercises
3 - 8
Voucher
Task
9
Donation
Survey 3
10
Lab
11
Altruistic Treatment: Surveys 1+2 Exercises
Donation
Task Survey 3 Lab
Donation
Figure 3.1: Timeline of experiment
generate the main donation later on. We describe the task in detail below. Session 1 and
Session 2 were the same for both treatment groups.
In Session 3 to Session 8, subjects worked on simple exercises that took between five
and fifteen minutes to complete per session. Upon solving a minimum of exercises cor-
rectly, subjects in the Control Treatment received a e5-Amazon voucher via email the
following day. Subjects in the Altruistic Treatment did not receive anything themselves.
Instead, upon solving the same minimum of exercises correctly, a donation was made to
a project of the charity SOS Kinderdörfer the following day. After the donation had been
made, the participants received a confirmation email. They were also informed about
the possibility to review the donation receipts during the final laboratory session. The
specific project the donation was made to changed with every session. All charitable
projects were related to humanitarian causes. Upon starting each session, subjects in
Treatment A received a short description of the project4, which subjects of the Control
Treatment did not read. Otherwise, instructions were identical. To stay in the exper-
iment and to receive the final reimbursement of e100, a successful completion of the
exercises was not required. Subjects in both treatments therefore had the choice to just
click through the exercises and not work at all. Working for the donation or the voucher
was therefore not mandatory, but depended on each subject’s own decision.
One possible caveat of choosing to pay subjects in Treatment C more than subjects in
Treatment A via Amazon vouchers is that the increased payoff could have led to the effect
that subjects in Treatment C felt more obliged to work in return and therefore increased
their later prosocial behavior. However, we still decided to do so for two reasons. First,
donations and prosocial behavior in general are usually costly and therefore go along
with a decreased endowment. Second, the gift exchange effect goes into the opposite
4Project descriptions were all based on descriptions of SOS Kinderdörfer’s official homepage (SOS
Kinderdörfer, 2016). Information on poverty was based on information provided by Aktion Deutschland
Hilft (2016).
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direction of our hypothesized effect; therefore, our design is a conservative test in that
regard.
Figure 3.2 shows an overview of which exercises were used in Session 3 to Session 8.
In Session 3 and Session 6, the exercise was solving easy Raven matrices. In Session 4 and
Session 7, the exercise consisted of translating a sequence of ciphers into a word using a
translation key. In Session 5 and Session 8, the exercise was to partially solve a Sudoku
riddle (see Appendix 3.C for screenshots of the exercise screens and Appendix 3.B for
detailed instructions and exercise descriptions). Exercises were chosen to be easy, yet
somewhat time consuming in order to make them solvable for everyone but requiring to
work for the payoff or donation nonetheless.
Session:
Exercise: Raven
3
Translation
4
Sudoku
5
Raven
6
Translation
7
Sudoku
8
Figure 3.2: Exercises in Session 3 to Session 8
Session 9, Session 10, and Session 11 were again identical for both treatment groups.
In Session 9, all subjects participated in the same real-effort task in order to generate a
donation. The real-effort task was the task Counting Zeros. On each screen, subjects saw
a 12×12-matrix with each field containing either a zero or a one. Subjects were asked
to count the zeros. For every correctly solved task, a donation of e0.20 was made to a
project supporting Ebola-orphans of the charity SOS Kinderdörfer. They also received a
short description of the project, which was new to all of the participants. For every falsely
counted matrix,e0.05 were subtracted from the donation to prevent people from guess-
ing.5 Subjects could stop working at any moment by entering the word “stop” into a field
and were made aware that this would in no way effect their own final payment. Sub-
jects could solve up to 40 tasks, which would have taken approximately 40 to 60 minutes.
Therefore, the maximum donation was e8. Subjects could see their current donation at
any time and received feedback on their answer after every table. The task was chosen
such that it required a significant amount of concentration and effort to make it costly
and cumbersome. As in any previous sessions, the donations were transferred the day
after Session 9, and every participant received a confirmation email. Furthermore, a re-
ceipt of the overall donation was made available to all participants during Session 11.
In Session 10, subjects answered a survey (S3), which was the same as the one that
subjects had answered in Session 2 (S2), to test for changes in preferences and personal-
ity measures between before and after the intervention.
5We allowed for a margin of error of +/−1. Also, the overall donation could not become negative.
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Session 11, the last session, took place during week six at the BonnEconLab. In this
session, subjects answered 20 multiple choice quiz questions concerning topics that
were either general knowledge or had some connection to the charitable projects to
which donations had been made. Subjects earned e0.20 per correctly answered ques-
tion. They received direct feedback and the correct answer after answering each ques-
tion and could see their current earnings at any given time. We included this session
because we wanted to test for the possibility of people in the Altruistic Treatment acquir-
ing information on the charitable projects and therefore increasing their willingness to
donate. Since we do not find any difference in quiz results between treatments, we do
not discuss the results further. Upon finishing the questionnaire, subjects received their
final payment, which consisted of their reimbursement for the overall participation plus
the amount earned during the quiz. Subjects could also review all the donation receipts.
This concluded the experiment.
3.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
In deriving our hypotheses and designing our experiment, we had the following mech-
anism in mind. People hold a certain belief about who they are, or put differently, they
have a self-image. Part of this self-image is an idea about how prosocial they are. In or-
der to avoid cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982), people try to act in accor-
dance with this self-image. If a person now performs a good deed, this satisfies the desire
to re-affirm the self-image and leads to the effect that in the immediate time afterwards,
prosocial behavior is not as necessary and can be reduced. This effect wears off after
some time, after which a new good deed is necessary to keep up the good self-image.
The other way around, in a short time frame, antisocial deeds will increase prosocial be-
havior directly afterwards. These short term fluctuations around the “inner” or “natural”
level of prosociality can lead to the typically found moral licensing and moral cleansing
effects that wear off after some time has passed.
However, we argue that this self-image determining the “normal” amount of proso-
cial behavior is malleable. More specifically, by placing a person in an environment that
brings her to behave repeatedly prosocially over a longer time frame, she will update her
self-perception after some time. This could happen due to a self-serving bias in attri-
bution of positive events. This self-serving bias has been documented in psychological
literature (see Malle (2006) for a summary) and refers to the finding that people tend to
explain their successes (or positive behaviors) with personal characteristics, while they
explain failures (or negative behaviors) with situational factors. Therefore, even if peo-
ple are induced to behave prosocially mainly by the environment (by making prosocial
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behavior cheap or occur as a side effect), people overestimate the role of their own per-
sonality and preferences and use the positive signals to update their self-image. This
updated self-image will then lead to an increase in the overall level of prosociality, which
leads to our first hypothesis about the effort provided in generating the donation.
Hypothesis 3.1. Subjects who repeatedly commit prosocial acts due to a stimulating en-
vironment (Altruistic Treatment) behave more prosocially afterwards.
Our first hypothesis concerns the effort that subjects exert in Session 9 when gener-
ating a donation for a good cause by working on the real-effort task Counting Zeros. The
hypothesis says that subjects from the Altruistic Treatment, who donated up to six times
in the previous sessions, will generate higher donations in this final task.
If the mechanism we describe above is what leads to an increase in prosocial be-
havior, we should also be able to see changes in survey responses measuring prosocial
attitudes. This motivates our second hypothesis about the survey responses on altruistic
preferences.
Hypothesis 3.2. Subjects in the Altruistic Treatment report stronger altruistic preferences
at the end of the experiment than at the beginning.
The second hypothesis concerns the survey responses we elicit in Session 2 and in
Session 10. In both sessions, we ask subjects how willing they would be to donate to a
charity. The hypothesis says that we expect reports of altruistic attitudes to be higher at
the end of the experiment in Treatment A, but not in Treatment C.
3.4 Results
Overall, 50 subjects signed up for the experiment of whom three subjects did not com-
plete the first or second survey and are therefore excluded from the analysis. Of the re-
maining 47 participants, only five subjects missed one session and one subject missed
two sessions. 23 subjects were randomized into Treatment A and 24 subjects into Treat-
ment C. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of key parameters for Treatment A and Table
3.2 for Treatment C.
Subjects are on average 19.7 years old, 64% of them are women. The variable Task
Ability measures how many out of five tables of the real-effort task Counting Zeros sub-
jects solve correctly when practicing the task in Session 2. On average, participants solve
3.2 tasks correctly. Life satisfaction and altruism are each measured on a scale from 0 to
10, values reported here refer to the responses given in Session 2 at the beginning of the
experiment before the intervention. Subjects report on average a life satisfaction of 7.0
and altruism of 7.3. None of the differences in these variables between treatment groups
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Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Observations
Female 0.609 0 1 0.499 23
Age 19.784 18.529 20.712 0.647 23
Task Ability 3.217 1 5 1.204 23
Happiness 7.391 3 9 1.530 23
Altruism Session 2 7.391 3 10 2.126 23
Table 3.1: Summary statistics Treatment A
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard
deviation
Observations
Female 0.667 0 1 0.482 24
Age 19.664 18.310 20.759 0.754 24
Task Ability 3.125 0 5 1.361 24
Happiness 6.708 2 10 2.095 24
Altruism Session 2 7.250 3 10 1.939 24
Table 3.2: Summary statistics Treatment C
are significant to a significance level of 1% (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test). We include
histograms for all elicited variables in Appendix 3.A. All 47 subjects solve — given they
participated in the respective session — the required number of exercises in Session 3 to
Session 8 and therefore all either generate a donation or receive an Amazon voucher.
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Figure 3.3: Donation Session 9
Figure 3.3 shows histograms of Session 9 donation, one for Treatment C and one for
Treatment A. Overall, we do not find the predicted positive effect of Treatment A on Ses-
sion 9 donation, but a negative moral licensing effect. On average, subjects in Treatment
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A generate a donation ofe1.81, subjects in Treatment C a donation ofe2.15. We can see
that there is a higher variation in donations in Treatment A, which we discuss in detail
below. The distribution of donations is heavily skewed to the right. Almost all dona-
tions (85%) are betweene0 ande4, which is in the lower half of possible donations; the
maximum possible donation being e8. Therefore, we focus our analysis on logarithmic
donations to decrease the effect of outliers and focus on differences in the lower ranges.
We set donations ofe0 (only three observations) toe0.05.
Dep. variable: Log Donation
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment A Dummy -0.598 -0.622∗ -0.630∗
(0.366) (0.355) (0.355)
Altruism Session 2 0.175∗∗ 0.159∗∗
(0.0817) (0.0773)
Task Ability 0.112
(0.150)
Constant 0.415∗ -0.852 -1.087
(0.213) (0.631) (0.801)
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.0565 0.133 0.145
Note: OLS regression; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001; robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Table 3.3: Effect of treatment, initial altruism, and task ability on log donation
Table 3.3 shows the main regression result. In Column 1, log donation from Session
9 is regressed on a Treatment A dummy, which is 1 if participants were in the Altruistic
Treatment and 0 if subjects were in the Control Treatment. The coefficient is negative
and not significant. However, when controlling for self-reported altruism elicited in Ses-
sion 2, i.e., before the treatment, in Column 2, the coefficient only changes slightly, but
becomes significant at a significance level of 10%. Hardly anything changes when addi-
tionally controlling for task ability (measured during the practice phase in Session 2) in
Column 3. This result is not in line with Hypothesis 3.1 and we discuss it below.
We now turn to Hypothesis 3.2, which claims that reports on altruistic attitudes should
increase more for subjects in Treatment A. To measure participants’ altruistic prefer-
ences, we ask them to state their willingness to donate to a good cause without expecting
something in return on a scale from 0 to 10 in Session 2 and in Session 10. Table 3.4
repeats the regressions shown in Table 3.3 with variable Altruism Session 10 as the de-
pendent variable. As can be seen, when controlling for Altruism measured in Session
2, the effect of the treatment on self-reported altruistic preferences is negative, but not
significant. Again, the result is not in line with Hypothesis 3.2.
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Dep. variable: Altruism Session 10
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment A Dummy -0.0417 -0.129 -0.112
(0.606) (0.481) (0.470)
Altruism Session 2 0.617∗∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.111)
Task Ability -0.231
(0.229)
Constant 7.042∗∗∗∗ 2.568∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗
(0.392) (0.916) (1.174)
Observations 47 47 47
R2 0.000106 0.367 0.387
Note: OLS regression; ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001; robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
Table 3.4: Effect of treatment, Session 2 altruism, and task ability on Session 10 altruism
To evaluate the change in altruistic preferences further, we subtract Session 2 an-
swers from Session 10 answers. Figure 3.4 shows two histograms showing the distribu-
tion of the difference in altruistic preferences, one for Treatment C and for Treatment
A.
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Figure 3.4: Difference in altruism measures between Session 10 and Session 2
On average, the difference is -.39 for subjects in Treatment A and -.21 in Treatment
C (both measures of altruism are not significantly different between treatments), which
does not confirm Hypothesis 3.2. Measures of altruistic preferences actually decrease
in both treatments (even though measures are highly correlated between Session 2 and
Session 10), and slightly stronger in Treatment A. However, we find an unexpected lower
Session 9 donation in Treatment A. As we explain later on, we interpret this effect as
moral licensing behavior. In this case, we would not expect a significant change in altru-
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istic preferences. We also do not find any interesting treatment differences in any other
variables.
Given the low sample size and the unexpectedness of results, it is difficult to draw
conclusions from our results. However, let us point to a finding for the purpose of careful
speculation. The standard deviations of the variables Session 9 donation and reported
changes in altruism measures are significantly higher for Treatment A. For Session 9 do-
nation, the standard deviation is 2.19 for Treatment A and 1.55 for Treatment C (p-value
of 0.05 for a one-sided variance ratio test). For the difference in altruistic preferences (c.f.
Figure 3.4), the standard deviation is 2.23 for Treatment A and 1.32 for Treatment C (p-
value of 0.008 for a one-sided variance ratio test). The significantly higher variance for
both variables represents that in Treatment A, there are subjects with very low donations
as well as with very high donations. Similarly in Treatment A, there are subjects who dra-
matically decrease their reported altruism, but also those who increase it. In Treatment
C, donations and altruism differences are less extreme.
This could possibly be due to two reasons. As we hypothesized before, we think that
in order for our intervention to work and actually increase prosocial behavior over time,
a long enough time frame for the self-image to adjust is essential and that in a too short
time frame moral licensing effects could prevail. If it were the case that our treatment
was just long enough for some people to show the expected effect, whereas for others it
would have taken more time, the observed pattern could be explained. Another option
would be that the treatment works for some type of people, whereas for others it does not
work. For example, some people could have a more malleable self-image, or could be
very open to prosocial behavior. However, as mentioned above, all of this is speculative,
but might constitute interesting research questions for the future.
3.5 Discussion
We conduct a long-run laboratory experiment to shed light on the development of proso-
cial behavior and on the spillover effects of environments that stimulate prosociality. We
find a weakly significant negative effect of such a stimulating environment on a subse-
quent donation decision. Moreover, we find that subjects in the treatment group do not
increase their self-reported altruistic attitudes relative to subjects in the control group.
In deriving our hypotheses, we emphasize that a long enough time fame is crucial
for altruistic capital formation to work. It could certainly be the case that in order to
find a positive treatment effect, a period of three weeks of active intervention is not long
enough for subjects to adapt their self-image. As mentioned in Section 3.4, this goes in
line with our finding of higher standard deviations in donations and changes in altru-
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istic attitudes in the treatment group: some people might have already adjusted while
others might have needed more time. Our evidence at this point is merely suggestive
and requires further exploring to find out which types of environments can sustainably
increase prosocial behavior. It is also debatable if self-image and preferences are still
malleable enough during adulthood. We therefore suggest a longer study with children
in order to find out if stimulating environments can, over time, lead to more altruistic
preferences.
Another possible issue with our experiment is the different compensation between
treatments. Subjects in Treatment C receivee30 more in Amazon vouchers than subjects
in Treatment A. With this design choice, our experiment more closely mimics real world
environments, in which altruistic behavior is typically costly. However, this might lead
to a gift exchange effect making people in Treatment C feeling obliged to donate more in
order to compensate their high payoff. Indeed, when we ask subjects in a final comment
section about their choice of work effort for generating the donation in Session 9, some of
the participants in Treatment A mention that they tried to pay back thee30 they received
in Session 3 to Session 8. This effect could mask the altruistic capital effect, which we are
interested in. We would therefore suggest an experiment in which endowment is kept
equal between treatment groups or varied in a 2×2 design.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to find out if there are other factors in an envi-
ronment that can influence if altruistic capital is built up or not. One option is to vary
if initial prosocial behavior is observed. We imagine that being observed during good
behavior can accelerate the change in self-image by making the behavior more salient.
It could also be the case that not only self-image but also social image plays a role when
determining prosocial behavior.
Overall, we believe that more research will be needed in order to understand how
people develop prosocial preferences and which environments are suited to foster them.
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3.A Summary of Variables
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Figure 3.7: Histograms
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3.B Instructions
Instructions have been translated from German. Project descriptions were all based on
descriptions of SOS Kinderdörfer’s (2016) official homepage. Information on poverty was
based on information provided by Aktion Deutschland Hilft (2016).
Session 1 (31 May 2016)
Thank you for participating in our study and welcome to the first part of the experiment!
Before we start with today’s experiment, we have some information for you. As already
mentioned in the invitation to this study, we are going to send you a link via email ev-
ery Monday and Thursday during the following weeks. The addresses from which these
emails will be sent are noreply@qemailserver.com and bonneconlab-online@uni-bonn.de.
You can then participate in the experiments following the corresponding links. You have
time until 23:59 of the respective day to participate in each part of the experiment. Af-
terwards, the link sent by us loses validity. You should therefore be careful to take part
in the experiments until 23:59 of the respective day. For participating in all parts of the
experiment, you will receivee100.
The last part of the experiment, as mentioned in the invitation email, will take part dur-
ing the first week of July. In a few weeks, you will be able to choose the date. This last part
of the experiment will take 30 minutes at most.
Due to the data protection regulations of the BonnEconLab, we have to ask for your email
address again. We will use this email address for the remainder of the study. Please be
sure to enter the same email address that you used for registering with the BonnEcon-
Lab. Participation is only possible with this specific email address.
Please enter your email address in the following field:
Email address:
Please repeat your email address:
Email address:
Coming to the end of today’s part, we are asking you for some information on your per-
son:
Date of birth (DD/MM/YYYY):
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Field of Study:
Number of Semesters:
Gender: male/female
Please click “Continue” to finish this part.
Session 2 (2 June 2016)
Welcome to the second part of the experiment!
In this part of the experiment it will be your task to count the number of zeros in a table
und answer a questionnaire at the end.
You will now see a table on each following screen that contains zeros and ones. You have
to count how many zeros are in the table. You can enter your answer directly on the same
screen. As soon as you confirm your answer, we will tell you if it was correct or not, and
a new table will be generated.
Please try to answer the tasks as quickly as possible.
Please click “Continue” to begin with the tasks.
Count the zeros in the following table and state the exact number in the field below:
How many zeros are in the table?
[See Screenshot 3.11 in Appendix 3.C]
Your answer was not correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
[or:]
Your answer was correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
In the following, we are asking you to answer some questions.
Here are different characteristics a person can have. Probably, some of the characteristics
will apply to you personally whereas others do not. For some, you may be undecided.
Please use the following scale to answer: value 1 means “does not apply at all” and value
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7 means “applies very much”. With the values between 1 and 7, you can grade your eval-
uation.
I see myself as someone, who. . .
- is a reliable worker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is talkative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is sometimes rude to others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is original, comes up with new ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- worries a lot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- has a forgiving nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- tends to be lazy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is outgoing, sociable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- values artistic, aesthetic experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- gets nervous easily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- does things efficiently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is reserved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is considerate and kind to almost everyone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- has an active imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- is relaxed, handles stress well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In the following, we are interested in how much you are willing to take on risks. Please
state your evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “not at all willing to take on risks”
and 10 means “very willing to take on risks”. You can grade your evaluation with the
values in between.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
We are now asking you for your willingness to behave a certain way. Please state your
evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “not at all willing to do this” and 10 means
“very willing to do this”. You can grade your evaluation with the values in between.
How much are you willing to forego something that carries utility for you in order to
benefit from it in the future?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To what extent would you be willing to punish someone who has treated you unfairly
even though this has negative consequences for you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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To what extent would you be willing to punish someone who has treated somebody else
unfairly even though this has negative consequences for you?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To what extent would you be willing to donate to a good cause without expecting some-
thing in return?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Please think about how you would act in the following situation. You are in an unknown
area und notice that you got lost. You are asking a stranger for the way. The stranger
offers to accompany you to your destination.
Helping you costs the stranger approximately e20. However, the stranger says that he
does not want money from you. You have six gifts with you. The cheapest gift costs e5,
the most expensive gift costse30. Would you offer the stranger one of the gifts as a thank
you?
Yes/No
Which gift would you give to the stranger?
The gift worthe5
The gift worthe10
The gift worthe15
The gift worthe20
The gift worthe25
The gift worthe30
I don’t know
Imagine the following situation: today, you received an unexpectede1.000.
How much of the money would you donate to a good cause? Donation:
At the end, we want to ask you how satisfied you are with your life.
Please state your evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “completely satisfied” and
10 means “completely unsatisfied”.
How satisfied are you currently with your life?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Session 3 (6 June 2016)
Control Treatment
Welcome to the third part of the experiment
In today’s part of the experiment, it is your task to solve several riddles.
If you solve a certain amount of riddles correctly, we will send you an Amazon voucher
with a value ofe5,00 via email tomorrow.
Please click “Continue” to start working on the riddles.
Altruistic Treatment
Welcome to the third part of the experiment.
A repeating topic of the experiment will be help and support for suffering children around
the world. Children around the world are suffering from consequences of natural catas-
trophes, poverty, and wars. According to Aktion Deutschland Hilft, in 2015, 570 million of
children lived in extreme poverty, around 150 million are orphans. Despite considerable
efforts, the situation of many children in the world is still catastrophic in many ways.
In today’s part of the experiment, it is your task to solve several riddles.
If you solve a certain amount of riddles correctly, the experimenters will donate an amount
of e5,00 to a project of SOS Kinderdörfer tomorrow. As soon as the donation has been
made, we will send you a confirmation email and you can check the respective bank
statement after the laboratory session in July. Should you not solve enough riddles cor-
rectly the donation will not be made.
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to the project Fight against Hunger of
SOS Kinderdörfer. Wordwide, almost one billion of people do not have enough food to
eat. Especially children and families suffer from this; they are therefore supported by SOS
Kinderdörfer. They give children in need a perspective and enable parents step by step
to self-help: with food, seeds, and education. Via SOS-Familienhilfe, they fight against
worldwide poverty and hunger, e.g. in Bangladesh, Niger, or Nicaragua.
Please click “Continue” to start working on the riddles.
Both Treatments
Your score:
3.B. Instructions | 86
Which of Figures 1 to 8 fits in the framed field?
[See Figure 3.8 in Appendix 3.C]
Your answer was correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
[or:]
Your answer was not correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
Control Treatment
Congratulations, you solved two riddles correctly.
You will receive your Amazon voucher with a value ofe5,00 via email tomorrow.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can purchase the voucher.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than two of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
Altruistic Treatment
Congratulations, you solved two riddles correctly.
A donation ofe5,00 will be made to the project Fight against Hunger of SOS Kinderdör-
fer.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can make the donation generated by
you.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than two of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
Session 4 (9 June 2016)
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Control Treatment
Welcome to the fourth part of the experiment.
[See Session 3]
Altruistic Treatment
Welcome to the fourth part of the experiment.
[See Session 3]
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation will go to the project Support of AIDS-Orpans
of SOS Kinderdörfer. After having to witness their parents dying, for many children the
battle to survive begins. Many Aids-orphans end up on the streets. Adolescents, many
of them still half children, are trying to take care of younger siblings. Others grow up
with strained grandparents. They do not have enough to eat, not to mention money for
school. Especially in Africa, HIV/Aids destroys the future of millions of children. SOS
Kinderdörfer supports affected families via education, medication, money for school, or
new homes in one of their villages.
Please click “Continue” to start working on the riddles.
Both Treatments:
Today’s task will be to decode words that have been coded into ciphers back into letters.
For this, you receive the following key of decoding (you will see the key on every screen):
a = 17 n = 19 b = 8 o = 3 c = 26 p = 24 d = 1 q = 21 e = 11 r = 6 f = 4 s = 7 g = 18 t = 22 h = 2 u
= 5 i = 10 v = 20 j = 13 w = 25 k = 14 x = 9 l = 16 y = 15 m = 23 z = 12
You will be asked to decode a sequence of ciphers, which each stands for a word, back
into letters.
For example, you see the following sequence of ciphers:
17 24 4 11 16
Given the above key of decoding, the solution is „apfel“, which you have to enter in
a field. Please notice that neither mutated vowels, space characters, nor punctuation
marks will appear in the words. Upper and lower cases are not relevant. Please click
“Continue” to start with the tasks.
Your score:
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Key of decoding:
Please enter the translation of the following sequence of ciphers in the field below:
[See Figure 3.9 in Appendix 3.C]
Your answer was correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
[or:]
Your answer was not correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
Control Treatment
Congratulations, you solved three riddles correctly.
You will receive your Amazon voucher with a value ofe5,00 via email tomorrow.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can purchase the voucher.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than three of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
Altruistic Treatment
Congratulations, you solved three riddles correctly.
A donation ofe5,00 will be made to the project Support of AIDS-Orphans of SOS Kinderdör-
fer.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can make the donation generated by
you.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than three of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
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Session 5 (13 June 2016)
Control Treatment
Welcome to the fifth part of the experiment.
[See Session 3]
Altruistic Treatment
Welcome to the fifth part of the experiment.
[See Session 3]
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to the project Support of Girls in India
of SOS Kinderdörfer. They are abandoned or killed as babies, others are starved as small
children – because their families do not want daughters. In India, girls are reckoned to be
a burden and a curse, because daughters have to be endowed with a dowry, which many
cannot afford. SOS Kinderdörfer protects girls in danger and advocates their rights. In
India’s 41 villages, girls that were abandoned, cast out, or left alone, find a new home,
grow up with equal rights, and receive an education.
Please click “Continue” to start working on the riddles.
Both Treatments
It will be your task to solve so-called Sudoku riddles. For this, you will see a 9×9-matrix
as the following on each screen:
Your task is to find out which cipher belongs in the green field. To solve a Sudoku, the
following rule applies:
Each row, each column, and each 3×3-box must contain the ciphers 1 to 9 exactly once.
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The cipher we are looking for is definitely defined by the already existing black ciphers
and can be deduced from them directly.
In our example, the cipher 5 is missing. This can be deduced as follows from the black
ciphers.
Let’s look at the 3×3-box in the middle of the riddle, which contains the green box:
Here, the ciphers 3 and 2 have already been entered. From these, it can be deduced that
the cipher 5 must be written into one of the remaining seven boxes, since every 3×3-box
has to contain the ciphers 1 to 9 exactly once. If we now look at the whole riddle again,
we can see that cipher 5 cannot stand in the upper row of the 3×3-box since this row
already contains a cipher 5 and one cipher must not appear twice in one row.
Cipher 5 can neither be written in the middle column and the right column of the central
3×3-box, since 5 already appears once in each of the two columns:
Now, the only spot left available for cipher 5 in the 3×3-box is the green box, therefore 5
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is the solution.
The rest of the Sudoku can be solved using similar logic. The completely solved riddle
(just as an example, you will not be asked to solve a whole riddle yourself) looks like the
following:
Please click “Continue” to start with the tasks.
[See Figure 3.10 in Appendix 3.C]
Your answer was not correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
[or:]
Your answer was correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the tasks.
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Control Treatment
Congratulations, you solved two riddles correctly.
You will receive your Amazon voucher with a value ofe5,00 via email tomorrow.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can purchase the voucher.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than two of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
Altruistic Treatment
Congratulations, you solved two riddles correctly.
A donation ofe5,00 will be made to the project Support of Girls in India of SOS Kinderdör-
fer.
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can make the donation generated by
you.
[or:]
You answered all available riddles, but unfortunately you solved less than two of them
correctly.
Please click “Continue” to end the survey.
Session 6 (16 June 2016)
[See Session 3, except the project description:]
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to the project Building a Children’s Vil-
lage in South Sudan of SOS Kinderdörfer. The terrible civil war in South Sudan has al-
most destroyed everything that made up the lives of the habitants of the children’s village
in Malakal. At the moment, they are living in a temporary village in Juba made of mud
huts. SOS Kinderdörfer wants to give them a perspective for the future. They want to
build a permanent and save home for the 89 children and 23 adolescents and their SOS-
mothers in the next two to three years.
Session 7 (20 June 2016)
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[See Session 4, except the project description:]
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to the project Help after Earthquake in
Nepal of SOS Kinderdörfer. The devastating earthquake of 25 April 2015 has brought suf-
fering and destruction to the people of the Himalaya region. SOS Kinderdörfer supports
children and families in Nepal: via first lifesaving emergency aid right after the catastro-
phe, now via helping and supporting families and students by building new schools and
family homes.
Session 8 (23 June 2016)
[See Session 5, except the project description:]
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to a Clinic of SOS Kinderdörfer in Mo-
gadishu, Somalia. Hunger, a civil war and missing infrastructure are threatening the
lives of children in Somalia. The mortal rate of boys and girls under age five is high. Ev-
ery tenth child in Somalia dies before its first birthday. In the country, which basically
does not have a public health care system, the SOS-mother-child-clinic in the capital is
an important place to go. In the clinic, amongst others, malnutrition and Malaria are
treated, vaccinations are done, and support for births is offered.
Session 9 (27 June 2016)
Welcome to the ninth part of this experiment!
The purpose of this part will be help and support for suffering children around the world.
Children around the world are suffering from consequences of natural catastrophes,
poverty, and wars. According to Aktion Deutschland Hilft, in 2015, 570 million of chil-
dren lived in extreme poverty; around 150 million are orphans. Despite considerable
efforts, the situation of many children in the world is still catastrophic in many ways.
In this part of the experiment, your task will be to count zeros in tables.
You will now see a table on each following screen that contains zeros and ones. You have
to count how many zeros are in the table. You can enter your answer directly on the same
screen. As soon as you confirm your answer, we will tell you if it was correct or not, and
a new table will be generated.
For every task you solve correctly, a donation of e0.20 will be made to a project of SOS
Kinderdörfer by the experimenters tomorrow. This means that the more tasks you solve,
the higher the total donation.
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Notice: for every task for which you give a wrong answer, e0.05 will be subtracted from
the donation. You should therefore not guess, but try to solve all tasks carefully.
As soon as the donation has been made, we will send you a confirmation email and you
can check the respective bank statement after the laboratory session in July.
Purpose of the donation: today’s donation goes to the project Support of Ebola-Orphans
of SOS Kinderdörfer. Thousands of people have died from the Ebola virus. Staying be-
hind are traumatized children who have lost their parents and are treated as outcasts.
The affected children are in need of protection and help. Ebola-orphans are stigmatized.
Out of fear of contagion, many of them are not taken in by their relatives and end up
on the streets. Especially the weakest do not have anyone standing by their side. SOS
Kinderdörfer takes care of them now and in the coming years.
You yourself decide how long you want to work on the tasks. You can end the task when-
ever you want. While you are working on the task, you will always see an empty field.
If you want to end the task, please enter the word “stop” into the field and the donation
that you have generated up to that point will be made by the experimenters.
Please click “Continue” to start with the task.
Your donation: e
If you want to end working on the tasks, please enter the word “stop” into the following
field:
Count the zeros in the following table and enter the exact number into the field below:
[See Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.C]
Your answer was correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the task.
[or:]
Your answer was not correct.
Please click “Continue” to continue with the task.
[or:]
You have stopped working on the task.
Your donation ise.
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Thank you for pariticpating!
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can donate the amount generated by
you.
[or:]
You solved all tasks.
Your donation ise.
Thank you for participating!
Please click “Continue”, so that the experimenters can donate the amount generated by
you.
Session 10 (30 June 2016)
Welcome to the tenth part of this experiment!
In this part of the experiment, we are asking you to fill out a questionnaire.
Please click “Continue” to start answering the questionnaire.
[See questionnaire Session 2]
Session 11 (4, 5, or 7 July 2016.)
Welcome to the eleventh and final part of this experiment!
Before we start the study, we want to know how satisfied you are with your life.
Please state your evaluation on a scale from 0 to 10. 0 means “completely satisfied” and
10 means “completely unsatisfied”.
How satisfied are you currently with your life?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Please click “Continue” to start the study.
In today’s part of the experiment it will be your task to take part in a short quiz and answer
questions.
For every correctly answered question you receive an additional payoff ofe0.20.
Please click “Continue” to start answering the questions.
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[See Figure 3.12 in Appendix 3.C]
Thank you, you answered all questions.
You are receiving an additional payment ofe.
Please click “Continue” to end the experiment and go to the adjoining room to receive
your payment.
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3.C Screenshots
Figure 3.8: Screenshot of real-effort task Raven Matrices of Sessions 3 and 6
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Figure 3.9: Screenshot of real-effort task Translation of Sessions 4 and 7
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Figure 3.10: Screenshot of real-effort task Sudoku for Sessions 5 and 8
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Figure 3.11: Screenshot of real-effort task Counting Zeros for Session 9
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Figure 3.12: Screenshot of quiz question of Session 11
Chapter 4
Image Concerns and the Dynamics of
Prosocial Behavior1
4.1 Introduction
Prosocial behavior is a pervasive facet of human interactions. Humans volunteer, give
money to charities, donate blood, and help friends as well as strangers. All of these ac-
tivities evoke personal costs but people are nonetheless willing to make sacrifices to in-
crease social welfare (Charness and Rabin, 2002). Such behavior is often understood to
reflect social preferences.2 Ample evidence suggests that social preferences positively af-
fect economic success (Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Becker et al., 2012; Algan et al., 2014)
and well-being (Dunn et al., 2008; Park et al., 2017) in several contexts.3
Policy makers and corporations may hence wish to foster the prevalence of social
preferences to obtain its benefits. However, the current state of knowledge on the mal-
leability and the development of social preferences allow little guidance, as our under-
standing of the matter is still quite limited.
We experimentally investigate how prosocial behavior, one expression of social pref-
erences, can be fostered over time. One particular variable that can affect prosocial be-
havior is observability. It has repeatedly been shown that people behave differently when
others witness their actions (Zajonc, 1965; Guerin, 1983). In particular, being observed
usually increases prosocial behavior because people want to be liked and respected by
others (Ariely et al., 2009) or want to avoid resentment (DellaVigna et al., 2012). These
1This chapter is joint work with Louis Strang.
2Important manifestations of social preferences are, for instance, altruism (Becker, 1974, 1976), inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), and warm glow (Andreoni, 1989).
3Note that the correlation between social preferences and economic success could also be explained by
a respective correlation of both variables with IQ (Burks et al., 2009).
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studies report, however, only the change of behavior during the observation itself. Be-
yond that, little is known about the sustainability of these positive observability effects
and it is unclear how being observed affects the dynamics of prosocial behavior. We con-
tribute to the existing research by investigating spillover effects of being observed during
the decision over a prosocial act on subsequent prosocial behavior. We hypothesize that
observability not only increases immediate prosocial behavior but has positive spillover
effects on later behavior as well.
This hypothesis is motivated by a new—and at the same time ancient—approach to
conceptualize the formation of altruistic attitudes. According to Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics, virtues are formed through the practice of virtuous actions. In modern terminol-
ogy, engaging in prosocial behavior becomes a habit and eventually changes the person’s
self-image, meaning the way they think about themselves. They then keep up the proso-
cial behavior in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). This
idea is captured by the concept of altruistic capital that states that past altruistic behavior
accumulates altruistic capital that enables individuals to internalize how actions affect
others and finally increases future altruistic behavior (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017). Being
observed while doing something good should therefore increase later prosocial behavior
for two reasons. First, being observed should, due to image concerns, increase immedi-
ate prosocial behavior compared to a situation in which one is not observed. This builds
up altruistic capital, and has therefore positive spillover effects on subsequent behavior.
Second, we argue, that performing good deeds in front of others makes a given action
more salient, intensifies the experience and has therefore stronger effects on a person’s
self-image adjustment. Furthermore, it should also change people’s beliefs about their
social image; the way they think that others think about them. These image changes lead
to a stronger increase of altruistic capital. We capture these mechanisms in a theoretical
framework and derive our hypotheses formally.
We conduct two variants of a laboratory experiment to test if observability of earlier
prosocial actions influences later levels of prosocial behavior. The experiments differ
in the currency of giving in the later period (either money or effort) and in the mode
of observability (either one single observer or a multi-people audience). In Experiment
A, we find that prosocial behavior, as expected and in accordance with prior research,
increases when subjects are observed. We do not find such a difference in Experiment B.
Moreover, we find only small and insignificant positive effects of early observability on
subsequent prosocial behavior in both experiments.
We proceed as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature, Section 4.3 de-
scribes the two experimental designs, Section 4.4 presents a theoretical model and de-
rives predictions, Section 4.5 presents the results, and Section 4.6 discusses the results
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and concludes.
4.2 Literature
In economics, social preferences are traditionally understood to be persistent traits of
individuals—complementing other dimensions of their enduring personality (Becker et
al., 2012). They also have been found to be partially transmitted from generation to gen-
eration (Dohmen et al., 2012; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). However, there likewise
exists evidence that social preferences can be altered, for instance when interacting and
receiving attention from a socially-minded mentor during childhood (Kosse et al., 2019).
Moreover, altruistic behavior is highly context-dependent (Dana et al., 2007; Grossman,
2014): certain features may trigger people to behave less prosocially—for instance, when
contexts provide individuals with cues that potentially serve as excuses for not behaving
prosocially or when the responsibility for certain outcomes is diffused. At the same time,
other contexts promote prosocial behavior.
People have been shown to have image concerns, meaning they behave differently
when others are present and can observe their actions. This can be due to an opportu-
nity to display a convenient and normatively desired behavior, which is or is not in line
with own preferences. Regarding prosocial behavior, this implies that individuals tend to
behave more prosocially when they are observed, allowing them to obtain social recog-
nition for their actions (Alpizar et al., 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Powell et al., 2012; Bašic´
et al., 2018).
We seek to contribute to these findings by testing whether positive context effects
of image concerns on prosocial behavior spill over to subsequent behavior, that is, spur
circles of prosociality. In a broader context, we want to find out how prosocial behavior
can be increased sustainably by gradually changing social preferences.
Our project builds on theoretical and empirical literature on dynamics of prosocial
and moral behavior. When deriving our theoretical model of altruistic capital, we follow
Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) who argue that past altruistic behavior accumulates altruistic
capital which increases future altruistic behavior. Bénabou and Tirole (2011) offer an
underlying mechanism that could explain such an accumulation process. In their model,
agents gain utility from high self-esteem and make inferences about their true unknown
moral type by observing their own past moral or immoral actions. Moral behavior is
interpreted as an investment in one’s self-image. The model yields the conclusion that,
under certain conditions, good actions can build up moral capital and lead to further
good actions, whereas bad actions destroy moral capital and lead to further bad actions.
Empirical evidence on the development of altruistic behavior stems from psycholog-
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ical and recent economic research. There is evidence on people compensate early moral
or immoral behavior; it is observed that early prosocial actions lead to decreased proso-
ciality later on, whereas early selfish actions lead to an increase in prosocial behavior
(see Merritt et al., 2010, for a summary). Schmitz (2019) reports results from an exper-
iment on repeated social behavior in which subjects play a donation dictator game at
two points in time. The second donation is smaller and this decrease is even stronger if
both decisions happen within a day instead of having an extended period of one week
between the two decisions.
However, there also exists evidence on the Foot-in-the-Door Effect that refers to the
phenomenon that the acceptance of a small initial request leads to a more probable ac-
ceptance of a larger request that is made afterwards (Freedman and Fraser, 1966; De-
Jong, 1979; Beaman et al., 1983). It is argued that this effect shows due to a change in
self-perception of individuals who accept the first small request, which is therefore in
line with our argument.
Gneezy et al. (2012) experimentally investigate another dimension that is important
for subsequent altruistic behavior. They claim that the development of a prosocial self-
perception is only possible if prosocial acts involve personal costs. They find that people
increase prosocial behavior only when the initial prosocial behavior was costly. Costless
actions, in contrast, have no effect on subsequent prosocial decisions or can even de-
crease them. Our design incorporates this finding since subjects always have to invest
time and effort or money in order to behave altruistically.
Building on these previous works on moral dynamics, social recognition, and the
malleability of social preferences, we test not only the immediate effects of observabil-
ity on prosocial behavior but in particular how later prosocial behavior is affected. We
conjecture that social attention directed at one’s good deeds leads to an adjustment of
social-image and stronger adjustments of self-image. We therefore expect subjects to
increase their later prosocial behavior if they have been observed beforehand.
4.3 Experimental Design
We investigate the causal effect of observability on present and future prosocial behav-
ior by conducting two variants of a laboratory experiment. In both experiments, sub-
jects face two sequential prosocial decisions within one session (see Figure 4.1 for an
overview). We vary the observability of the subjects’ first decision between treatments:
in the Public-Private treatment, the first prosocial decision is observed by one observer
or a group of observers, while the second prosocial decision is always made in private. In
contrast, both decisions are made anonymously in the Private-Private treatment. We are
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primarily interested in second-stage prosocial behavior to evaluate the spillover effects
of being observed on subsequent non-observed prosocial behavior. We run two variants
of the experiment, which differ in the way donations are made and how observability is
implemented.
Both experiments were conducted at the BonnEconLab using oTree (Chen et al.,
2016) and hroot (Bock et al., 2014). Experiment A was conducted in August and Septem-
ber 2017 and a total of 242 subjects participated (including 37 subjects who served as ob-
servers). Experiment B was conducted in December 2017 and 77 subjects participated.
Section 4.A includes verbal and written instructions.
Public-Private: Decision Public
Stage 1
Donation 1
Decision Private
Stage 2
Donation 2
Private-Private: Decision Private
Donation 1
Decision Private
Donation 2
Figure 4.1: Treatment overview
Experiment A
In Experiment A, subjects participate in one of two roles. A minority of the subjects func-
tions as observers, that is they do not make any decisions themselves but solely monitor
the behavior of other subjects. The remaining subjects, irrespective of the treatment,
take the same two consecutive donation decisions.
Donation decisions are made as follows: in Stage 1, subjects can work on a real-effort
task called Counting Zeros (first implemented by Abeler et al., 2011) to generate a dona-
tion to a project of the charity SOS-Kinderdörfer. In this task, subjects face 15×10 - tables,
with all 150 cells each containing either the digits 0 or 1. On each screen, containing ex-
actly one table (see Figure 4.6 for a screenshot), subjects have to state the total number
of zeros that the table contains. Per correctly counted table, the generated donation in-
creases by a specific piece rate, which decreases in the number of completed tasks (see
Table 4.1). To prevent subjects from simply guessing the correct number, we subtract
e0.05 from the total donation for answers deviating by more than one from the correct
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number.4 Subjects can freely choose to stop working at any time and can leave earlier
when doing so. This allows for higher opportunity costs of exercising and hence more
costly prosocial acts.5 There is a maximum time of 20 minutes and a maximum number
of 25 tables, resulting in a maximum donation ofe2.90.
Stage 2 consists of a double-blind dictator game. In this stage, subjects open an en-
velope, which they already receive at the beginning of the experiment. This envelope
contains the subjects’ compensation ofe5 for participating in the experiment.6 The en-
velope also contains written instructions and a smaller envelope. The instructions state
that participants may leave any amount of the e5 in the small envelope to donate to a
different project of the same charity as in Stage 1.7
We use a between-session treatment variation to prevent subjects from the Private-
Private treatment being aware of any social component of the experiment. Sessions are
conducted in turns; each one lasting at most 30 minutes. We now describe the exact
procedure of each treatment.
Private-Private For each Private-Private session, we invite three participants to the
BonnEconLab.8 At the beginning, they receive the aforementioned envelope, verbal in-
structions to open it at the end of the experiment, and information about the size of their
compensation. Afterwards, they are sent to three separate rooms with one working space
and one computer each. They are told to choose their respective rooms themselves to
ensure a double-blind procedure and complete anonymity. Instructions for Stage 1 are
already displayed on the computer screens when subjects enter the room and they im-
mediately start with the experiment. In Stage 1, subjects work on the Counting Zeros task
described above to generate a donation between e0 and e2.90. After subjects decide to
4We allow for a margin of error of +/- 1. Also, the total amount cannot become negative.
5As mentioned before, Gneezy et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of positive costs.
6Observers in the Public-Private condition receive a flat payment ofe5 as well.
7Thee5 are provided in coins, such that all donations betweene0 ande5 in steps of 10 Cents are possi-
ble.
8In case that less than three subjects show up for a Private-Private session, the session is run with fewer
subjects.
Table 4.1: Experiment A: piece rates for correctly solving a table of Counting Zeros
Tables solved Piece rate
01 – 5 30 Cents
06 – 10 20 Cents
11 – 15 05 Cents
16 – 20 02 Cents
21 – 25 01 Cent
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stop working, they have solved the maximum number of tables, or time is up, they are
informed about their generated donation and open the envelope that leads to Stage 2,
which was not announced beforehand. After deciding how much money to donate in
the dictator game, subjects leave without talking to or seeing the experimenter or any of
the other subjects again.
Public-Private For each Public-Private session, we invite one additional subject, re-
sulting in a total of four subjects per session.9 At the beginning of each session, all four
subjects are seated at the same table and are asked to introduce themselves to each other
by stating their first name and field of study.10 Subsequently, one subject is randomly
determined to act as an observer whose only role it is to monitor the performances of
the remaining three subjects during Stage 1. After the observer is determined, he or she
is separated from the other subjects and seated at a computer. On this computer, the
other subjects’ screens are displayed such that the observer can monitor their perfor-
mances. Meanwhile, the other three subjects receive the same envelopes and the same
information as subjects in the Private-Private treatment. Additionally, they are told that
the observer will monitor their behavior and that each subject will have to report his or
her outcomes to the observer in person. The observer is not aware of the envelopes to
ensure the other subjects not feeling observed in Stage 2. From here on, the procedure
of Stage 1 is identical to Public-Private. Only at the end of this stage, before moving on to
Stage 2, when subjects are told about their donation, they are asked to go to the observer
and report their generated donation.
Upon returning from the observer, they open the envelope that leads to Stage 2,
which was not announced beforehand. The second stage proceeds in exactly the same
way as in the Private-Private treatment, including complete anonymity. After deciding
how much money to donate in the dictator game, subjects leave without talking to or
seeing the experimenter, the observer or any of the other subjects again.
Experiment B
In Experiment B, all subjects, irrespective of the treatment, take the same two consec-
utive donation decisions. For a tighter control of the dynamics of prosocial behavior,
we change, compared to Experiment A, the nature of the donation decisions. Instead
of using different donation decisions in Stage 1 and Stage 2, we now use the same real-
9In case that less than four but more than one subjects show up for a Public-Private session, we run the
session with three or two subjects. If only one subject shows up, he or she is paid a show-up fee and is sent
home.
10These personal interactions are used to create familiarity between subjects and have been used before.
See, for instance, Gächter and Fehr (1999) and Ewers and Zimmermann (2015).
4.3. Experimental Design | 109
Table 4.2: Experiment B: piece rates for a correctly pressed key combination of Click for
Charity
Correct combinations Piece rate
001 – 100 1.00 Cent
101 – 200 0.50 Cent
201 – 350 0.25 Cent
351 – 500 0.10 Cent
501 – 700 0.05 Cent
> 700 0.01 Cent
effort task in both stages. This allows detecting differences in prosocial behavior not
only across treatments but also within-subjects between Stage 1 and Stage 2. We now
can make a statement on the prevalence of the altruistic capital effect in observed and
non-observed situations.11 Moreover, we change the observational mechanism. Sub-
jects have to report their donation in front of all other subjects of the same session rather
than reporting to a single observer to further increase the salience of observability.12
We first describe the task used for making donation decisions. We closely follow the
design of Ariely et al. (2009) using their real-effort task Click for Charity in both stages.
The task consists of alternately pressing the keys “X” and “Y” on the computer key-
board13 for five minutes. For each correct combination, a piece rate is donated to a
project of the charity SOS-Kinderdörfer. Once again, the piece rate is concave and de-
clines in the number of correct combinations (see Table 4.2). Figure 4.7 shows a screen-
shot of the task screen. Again, the projects differ between the two stages.
The experiment is conducted as follows: subjects arrive at the laboratory and are ran-
domly assigned to one of the two treatments. When receiving the instructions, subjects
in the Public-Private treatment additionally learn that they will have to announce their
first name and their generated donation from Stage 1 at the end of the experiment in
front of all other participants of the session. Subjects in the Private-Private treatment do
not receive this information and are not aware of the other treatment condition.14 After
practicing the above described task Click for Charity, they can work on it for five minutes
to generate their Stage 1 donation. Note that none of the subjects is aware of Stage 2 dur-
11Note that one could argue that repeating the task might lead to fatigue and hence to a decline in perfor-
mance in the second stage, or, contrary, that learning might enhance performance. However, any time trend
effects are orthogonal to our main treatment comparisons and therefore cannot explain any differences be-
tween observed and unobserved subjects.
12On average, 22 subjects participate in one session.
13Computer keyboards all have a German layout.
14Subjects in both treatments only learn about the other treatment at the end of the experiment after both
stages are completed and subjects of the Public-Private treatment have to announce their donations.
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ing this phase. Only after finishing Stage 1, subjects receive written instructions for Stage
2, which follows the same procedure as Stage 1. However, now all subjects are specifically
informed that this stage’s donation is completely anonymous.
Furthermore, we ask subjects for their level of happiness at the beginning and at the
end (before the public announcement of donations) of the experiment.
Finally, participants receive a flat compensation ofe6. Each session lasts at most 40
minutes.
4.4 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we derive a simple theoretical model and present the hypotheses that fol-
low from it. According to Aristotle, people become virtuous by committing virtuous acts
and thereby accustoming to it. We model this habitual formation with the assumption
that people accumulate altruistic capital whenever doing something altruistic. When
deriving our model of altruistic capital formation, we follow the approach of Ashraf and
Bandiera (2017).
In period t = 1,2, Agent i chooses an altruistic action ai ,t ∈ [0, a¯]. The altruistic action
generates social welfare W
(
ai ,t
)
, but creates a cost c(ai ,t , Ai ,t ) at the same time, where
W
(
ai ,t
)
is increasing and concave in ai ,t and c(ai ,t , Ai ,t ) increases linearly in ai ,t . The
altruistic action ai ,t does not only generate social welfare and create costs but also accu-
mulates altruistic capital in the next period, denoted by Ai ,t+1. Share u of the altruistic
action increases social welfare in the same period, whereas share 1−u increases altru-
istic capital of the following period (this borrows from Lucas (1988)). Apart from this,
altruistic capital builds up faster, the higher the parameter κt , which reflects a partic-
ular form of self-awareness. It reflects our understanding that higher image concerns
make altruistic acts more salient and therefore enhance the internal habit formation
process. Image effects are common to all agents but are situation-specific, as they de-
pend for instance on the presence of an audience. In our experiment, we vary the effect
of image in the first period between treatments, assuming that κt is increasing in pub-
lic observability, that is κPublict > κPrivatet . In particular, altruistic capital in period t is
Ai ,t = (1−u)κt−1ai ,t−1+ (1−δ)Ai ,t−1, where δ captures the depreciation rate of altruistic
capital.
We argue that greater altruistic capital reduces the cost of acting altruistically as one
accommodates to altruistic behavior. Having a prosocial identity (due to self- and/or so-
cial image adjustments) makes behaving prosocially less costly since it reduces cognitive
dissonance and because the decision process becomes less difficult. We therefore as-
sume that altruistic capital decreases the cost of acting prosocially, that is, ∂c/∂ai ,t∂Ai ,t <
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Finally, agent i ’s utility in period t is equal to (σi +θt )W
(
ai ,t
)−c(ai ,t , Ai ,t ). The utility
increases proportionally in W for two reasons: first, the agent attaches a positive weight
σi on W that represents her individual social preferences, such as pure altruism or warm
glow. The second component, θt , expresses a second kind of image effects, where an
agent simply wants to make a better impression while being observed (social image). We
exogenously vary the parameter in our experiment, and we expect that θPublict > θPrivatet .
This image effect can be interpreted as the agent deriving utility from others thinking
well of her (social image). The agent seeks to maximize her utility by choosing ai ,t .
Stage 1 As subjects are randomly assigned to treatments, we assume that previously
accumulated altruistic capital and altruistic preferences, Ai ,1 and σi , are equally dis-
tributed for both treatment groups. Hence, the only difference between treatments con-
sists of the social observability. In the Public-Private treatment, we increase the social
image parameter θ1 and therefore the benefit of the generated social welfare.16 Conse-
quently, the agent has a higher return of her altruistic act and chooses a larger action
ai ,1.
Hypothesis 4.1. Subjects generate a greater donation in Stage 1 in the Public-Private treat-
ment than in the Private-Private treatment.
Stage 2 In the Public-Private treatment, observability occurs only in Stage 1 while sub-
jects make their first decision. The subsequent donation decision in Stage 2 is completely
private for all subjects and κ2 and θ2 should therefore be similar for both treatment
groups. Altruistic capital Ai ,2, however, is no longer equal as participants in the Public-
Private treatment choose a larger action ai ,1 due to θ1 and experience an additional in-
crease due to a higher κ1 (heightened self-awareness). This increases their altruistic cap-
ital stock with a higher rate, which in turn decreases the cost c(ai ,2, Ai ,2) in period t = 2.
A reduced cost makes it comparatively more attractive to engage in prosocial activities,
which leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.2. Subjects generate a greater donation in Stage 2 in the Public-Private treat-
ment than in the Private-Private treatment.
15Ashraf and Bandiera (2017) assume that altruistic capital increases the marginal product of the altruistic
action. Both assumptions are equivalent. We use cost reduction for the intuitive reason that habits reduce
the cost of the decision process as well as of the action itself.
16As the existence of Stage 2 is unknown when making the decision for ai ,1, there is no incentive for any
of the two treatment groups to choose a suboptimal ai ,1 in anticipation of an increased Ai ,2.
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4.5 Results
Experiment A
In Experiment A, a total of 203 subjects participate as decision makers, 102 subjects in
the Public-Private and 101 subjects in the Private-Private treatment. In Stage 1, in which
subjects can generate a donation by correctly counting zeros in tables, about 75% of all
subjects solve at least five tables correctly and subjects quit, on average, after 15.9 trials.
This results in an average donation ofe2.18 in the Public-Private treatment ande2.00 in
the Private-Private treatment (out of a maximum of e2.90 if all 25 tables are solved cor-
rectly within 20 minutes). Subjects in the Public-Private treatment spend significantly
more time working on the task (on average around 14 minutes in the Private-Private
treatment and around 17 minutes in the Public-Private treatment; the difference is sig-
nificant to a significance level of 1%). However, almost all subjects sacrifice some time
for the charitable act. In Stage 2, where subjects are no longer asked to spend time and
effort but money, only 62% of subjects donate a strictly positive amount at all, albeit 12%
give their complete show-up fee ofe5. Nonetheless, the average donation ise1.30 in the
Public-Private and e1.03 in the Private-Private treatment. Figure 4.2 displays donated
shares of the maximum possible amount separately for the two treatment groups and for
Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Figure 4.2: Donations in Experiment A: donated share of maximum possible donation
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Dep. variable: Donation 1 Donation2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.179∗ 0.257 0.269 0.804
(0.105) (0.226) (0.230) (0.803)
Donation 1 -0.0662 0.0425
(0.169) (0.218)
Public x Donation 1 -0.254
(0.342)
Constant 2.003∗∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 0.954∗
(0.0796) (0.154) (0.389) (0.489)
Observations 203 203 203 203
R2 0.0143 0.00638 0.00731 0.0107
Note: Coefficients in all columns are OLS estimates. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.3: Regression results: Experiment A
Table 4.3 reports OLS estimates for Experiment A. In Column 1, Stage 1 donation is re-
gressed on a treatment dummy, which is 1 if subjects are in the Public-Private treatment
and 0 if they are in the Private-Private treatment. The coefficient is positive (subjects
donate on average e0.18 more in the Public-Private treatment) and significant to a sig-
nificance level of 10%. This is in line with Hypothesis 1. In Column 2, Stage 2 donation
is regressed on the same treatment dummy. As stated in Hypothesis 2, the coefficient
is positive (subjects donate on average e0.26 more in the Public-Private treatment), but
not significant. In Column 3, Stage 2 donation is regressed on the treatment dummy, now
additionally controlling for Stage 1 donation. The coefficient of the dummy variable stays
almost the same compared to Column 2. The coefficient of Stage 1 donation is close to
zero, which suggests that a higher giving of Stage 1 does not per se induce higher giving in
Stage 2 but that observability itself induces higher giving. However, neither of the coeffi-
cients is significant. In Column 4, Stage 2 donation is regressed on the treatment dummy,
Stage 1 donation, and the product of Stage 1 donation and the treatment dummy. The
interaction term is negative, which could be a hint that for subjects in the Public-Private
treatment, Stage 1 donation has a negative effect on Stage 2 donation, speaking against
a general altruistic capital effect. However, again, none of the coefficients is significant.
Experiment B
In Experiment B, a total of 77 subjects participate. 37 subjects are in the Public-Private
and 40 subjects in the Private-Private treatment. In this experiment, subjects generate
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two donations by working on the real-effort task Click for Charity twice. Figure 4.3 shows
the distributions of number of clicks (performance) per subject separately for each treat-
ment group and each stage. We show graphics for performance levels instead of dona-
tions, since the concave piece rate leads to a low variation in actual donations. Therefore,
performance levels give a more accurate picture of differences in behavior. We show be-
low that qualitative results stay fairly unchanged when running the analysis for dona-
tions instead.
As in the previous experiment, almost all subjects engage in the task and generate
a donation larger than zero. The average donation (pressed pairs) in Stage 1 is e2.12
(837.14) in the Public-Private and e2.1 (876.45) in the Private-Private treatment. We do
not observe any decline in Stage 2 where the average donation (pressed pairs) is e2.13
(879.54) in the Public-Private and e2.03 (858.1) in the Private-Private treatment. Note
that in Stage 1, average donations are higher in the Public-Private treatment, whereas av-
erage key combinations are lower. This is possible due to the concave piece rate, which
increases donations strongly in the beginning and only weakly in the end. In the Public-
Private treatment, subjects press a lower total number of key combinations than in the
Private-Private treatment, but the minimum number of pressed pairs is higher. This re-
sults in higher average donations.
Figure 4.3: Performance levels (number of correctly clicked combinations) in Experiment
B
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As Figure 4.4 illustrates, we find a strong positive correlation (ρ = 0.667) of perfor-
mance between stages. Also, the difference of performance between Stage 1 and Stage
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Figure 4.4: Relation between performance levels for Stage 1 and Stage 2 in Experiment B
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2 is not significantly different from zero (using a t-test, p = 0.637), which shows that
subjects do not decrease their prosocial behavior over time. We also observe that correla-
tions between Stage 1 and Stage 2 performance in the Public-Private treatment (ρ = 0.76)
and in the Private-Private treatment (ρ = 0.64) are not significantly different from each
other.
Analyzing individual changes in performances between Stage 1 and Stage 2, we find
that in the Public-Private treatment around 70.3% of subjects increase their performance
between Stage 1 and Stage 2, whereas only 55% of subjects do so in the Private-Private
treatment. This finding is visualized in Figure 4.5. The difference of 15 percentage points
between treatments goes in the expected direction but is not significant (Wilcoxon Rank
sum Test, p-value of 0.17).
Table 4.4 replicates Table 4.3 for Experiment B and reports OLS estimates. In Col-
umn 1, Stage 1 donation is regressed on a treatment dummy, which is 1 if subjects are in
the Public-Private treatment and 0 if they are in the Private-Private treatment. In Experi-
ment B, the coefficient is also positive, but not significant. In Column 2, Stage 2 donation
is regressed on the same treatment dummy. As stated in Hypothesis 2, the coefficient is
positive (subjects donate on averagee0.1 more in the Public-Private treatment), but not
significant. In Column 3, Stage 2 donation is regressed on the treatment dummy, addi-
tionally controlling for Stage 1 donation. The coefficient of the dummy variable stays
almost the same compared to Column 2. However, the coefficient is still not significant.
The coefficient of Stage 1 donation is positive and highly significant which illustrates
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of subjects who increase or decrease their performance between
Stage 1 and Stage 2, separately for Public-Private and Private-Private
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again that Stage 1 and Stage 2 donations are strongly correlated. In Column 4, Stage 2 do-
nation is regressed on the treatment dummy, Stage 1 donation, and the product of Stage
1 donation and the treatment dummy. Again, the coefficients of the treatment dummy
and the interaction term are not significant.
Dep. variable: Donation 1 Donation2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public 0.0199 0.102 0.0954 -0.237
(0.0382) (0.0682) (0.0688) (0.408)
Donation Stage 1 0.317∗∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗∗
(0.0645) (0.0690)
Public x Donation Stage 1 0.157
(0.199)
Constant 2.100∗∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗∗ 1.392∗∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0677) (0.0739) (0.0792)
Observations 77 77 77 77
R2 0.00339 0.0267 0.0571 0.0577
Note: Coefficients in all columns are OLS estimates. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.4: Regression results: Experiment B, donations
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Since the correlation of performance and generated donations is only piecewise, Ta-
ble 4.5 reports regressions in the domain of performance. Again, there are no significant
treatment effects and none of the hypotheses can be supported.
Even in Stage 1, being observed does not have a significant effect on donation be-
havior, which we find surprising since we closely follow the design of Ariely et al. (2009)
and thus cannot replicate their findings. In contrast to their study, subjects in Stage 1
of our Private-Private treatment actually achieve a higher performance. Both treatment
groups accomplish numbers that are similar to those in the public condition of Ariely
et al. (2009). Furthermore, we have enough statistical power; a treatment difference in
performance similar to the one of Ariely et al. (2009) (on average 822 clicks in the public
condition and 548 clicks in the private condition) would be significant to a significance
level of 1% with our sample size. We use the same mechanism to implement social ob-
servability, as well as the same piece rates, even though the cutoffs are different as we
decrease the piece rate in steps of 100 instead of 200. The increased concavity could po-
tentially decrease the treatment difference in donations and therefore explain why we
do not find the same results. However, we observe subjects to continue the task even if
one click is worth only 0.01 Cent.17 To summarize, despite closely following the design
of Ariely et al. (2009), we are not able to detect any direct effect of public observability on
prosocial activities.
Dep. variable: Performance 1 Performance 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public -39.31 21.44 52.06 124.5
(51.45) (58.85) (42.87) (109.8)
Performance Stage 1 0.779∗∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗∗
(0.0651) (0.0831)
Public x Performance Stage 1 -0.0849
(0.133)
Constant 876.5∗∗∗∗ 858.1∗∗∗∗ 175.5∗∗∗ 144.9∗∗
(38.15) (48.65) (56.23) (64.98)
Observations 77 77 77 77
R2 0.00764 0.00171 0.455 0.456
Note: Coefficients in all columns are OLS estimates. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.5: Regression results: Experiment B, performances
17We do not believe that subjects are not capable of pressing more pairs in five minutes, as Ariely et
al. (2009) themselves have a control condition in which subjects work for high monetary incentives and
press, on average, 1290 combinations, which is also approximately the maximum level we observe.
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4.6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate spillover effects of observability on later unob-
served prosocial behavior, thereby studying the concept and prevalence of altruistic cap-
ital formation. We hypothesize that being observed during a good deed has a positive ef-
fect on subsequent prosocial behavior because people build up altruistic capital. People
feel obliged to maintain their positive social and self-image, even in situations in which
their actions are not observed by others, and keep on behaving prosocially. We do not
find such behavior, independent of the concrete nature of the prosocial act, either re-
quiring a donation of money or investing time.
This lack of supporting evidence is mainly due to the reason that social image as a
trigger of stronger prosocial behavior cannot be established in our experiments. We do
find only a weakly significant positive effect in Experiment A and an insignificant effect
in Experiment B. This result is not driven by a lack of prosocial behavior of subjects in
the Public-Private treatment but if anything by a substantial prosocial attitude of the
control group that does not face any social exposure in the first place. People are willing
to (repeatedly) sacrifice own resources for social welfare, regardless of observability. This
suggests other potential drivers of repeated prosocial activity: it is possible that people
already have a high altruistic capital stock and a prosocial self-perception and therefore
do not react to further motivation. It could therefore be interesting to run a similar study
with a subject pool that has not developed high prosocial preferences (e.g. children or
people who show very low altruistic preferences).
To summarize, people show substantial willingness to donate for a charitable reason.
Surprisingly, image effects do not seem to make a large difference in our chosen setups,
neither in the observed stages nor in the following non-observed stages. It might there-
fore be necessary to adjust the design. It seems that people are willing to spend time and
effort to generate donations and keep on working even if they are not observed and even
if the piece rate is extremely low. One solution would be to make donating more costly
in all stages, for example by not using real-effort tasks but dictator games that actually
lower participants’ income instead or by making the real-effort task more difficult and
thus more costly.
Given that the effect that we hypothesized can be found in a new study, it would
be interesting to disentangle different channels. We elaborate in this chapter that we
imagine observability to have an effect on subsequent prosocial choices via two chan-
nels. First, subsequent prosociality should increase because observability increases ini-
tial prosociality and this builds up altruistic capital. And second, because being observed
fosters the altruistic capital formation directly. Disentangling these effects would be dif-
ficult but could be done, for example, by running an experiment in which, in one treat-
4.6. Conclusion | 119
ment, initial prosociality is increased via observability and, in another treatment, via a
different incentive.
A consequence of no observation effects is that making conjectures on basic altru-
istic capital formation is more difficult. In order to test how early prosocial behavior
influences subsequent prosocial behavior, one perhaps requires another exogenous ma-
nipulation of prosocial behavior, for instance a direct manipulation (such as a manipu-
lation of the prosociality of a task’s consequences) or using social reference points. The
influence of the behavior of a reference person has been shown in various studies (e.g.
Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Schwerter, 2016). In the area of altruistic
and reciprocal behavior, information about others’ donations increases own contribu-
tions to a public good (Shang and Croson, 2009), and subjects match effort provision to
associates’ levels (Gächter et al., 2012, 2013; Thöni and Gächter, 2015).
In our design, subjects make decisions only within one session, which we see as a
conservative test of altruistic capital formation. Nonetheless, it might be the case that
the accumulation of altruistic capital requires a longer time horizon with repeatedly trig-
gered prosocial acts to form a habit of acting prosocially or to change people’s self-image.
Hence, another potential extension would be to conduct a new experiment in which
multiple stages take place in different weeks over a longer time horizon.
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4.A Instructions
These are the original instructions translated into English for both experiments. Instruc-
tions in italic were only for subjects in the Public-Private treatment.
Experiment A
Verbal Instructions to all participants (only Public-Private)
Welcome.
Before we start, I would like to point out that your decisions in this study might not be
completely anonymous. If you do not agree to these terms, you now have the possibility
to end your participation in this study.
I am now kindly asking you to introduce yourselves with your first name and subject of
study or occupation.
In this study, one of you has the role of an observer. All others are decision makers. All
decision makers will make a decision at the computer today. The observer is also seated
at a computer. This computer shows the computer screens of the decision makers. The
only task of the observer is to observe the decisions made by the decision makers. At
the end of the experiment, all decision makers furthermore tell the observer personally
about the decisions they made.
Everyone now please draw a card. The one of you with the red card takes the role of the
observer. This person please stays seated for now.
All others, with the black cards, please follow me to the adjoining room.
Verbal Instructions (all treatments)
You will receive e5 for your participation. The money is inside this envelope. Please do
not open it yet, but only after the screen reads that the experiment is finished. Please sign
here that you received the money. You can now go upstairs. You may choose an office
room with the numbers 1, 2 or 3. Please close the office door behind you and take a seat
at your working space. You can start immediately.
Instructions Observer (only to observers in Public-Private)
Welcome to this experiment!
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You will be taking the role of the observer. Your task will be to observe all participants of
the study and their choices.
For your participation in this study you will receivee5 in cash at the end.
On your screen, you can see the screens of three other participants in real time. This
means that you will be able to see the participants’ choices throughout the course of
the study. The other participants have the possibility to generate a donation for SOS
Kinderdörfer by solving tasks. At any time the participants may choose to stop solving
tasks. After they have stopped working on the tasks, the participants will come to you and
inform you about their room number as well as the amount of their generated donation.
For this, please leave your cubicle so that the participant cannot see your screen. Please
act neutral and do not speak. After all three participants have come to you, your part in
the experiment is finished and you will receive your payment. If you have any questions,
please only address them to us: raise your hand and we will come to you. The violation
of this rule will lead to you being excluded from this study and all its payments.
Screen 1 – Welcome and General Information
Welcome!
Today you have the possibility to generate a donation for the project Fight against Hunger
of SOS Kinderdörfer.
Worldwide, nearly one billion people do not have enough food. Especially children and
families are suffering from this and are therefore specifically being supported by SOS
Kinderdörfer. SOS Kinderdörfer provide a perspective to children in need and enable
parents step by step to self-help: with food, seeds and through education. Through their
SOS Family Help they are fighting against poverty and hunger around the globe, e.g. in
Bangladesh, Niger and Nicaragua.
You can generate the donation by solving as many tasks as you like out of a maximum of
25 tasks. These tasks will be explained in detail on the following page. Your observer can
see your screen. Right now, your observer can see these instructions and will also see how
many tasks you solve and therefore how much you donate. As soon as you decide not to
solve any more tasks, this experiment is over. Before you may leave, you have to let the
observer know if and how much you are donating.
You will find more details concerning the amount of the donation and the explanation
of the task on the following page. After the study is over, we will send you a copy of the
confirmation of all donations.
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Screen 2 – Explanation Task
Explanation Task
Your task is to count all zeros in a table consisting of zeros and ones.
For every correctly entered total number of zeros in a table, we donate a certain amount
to the aforementioned project of SOS Kinderdörfer. This amount varies with the number
of the tables as follows:
Tables 1–5: 30 Cents
Tables 6–10: 20 Cents
Tables 11–15: 5 Cents
Tables 16–20: 2 Cents
Tables 21–25: 1 Cent
For every wrong input, 5 Cents will be subtracted from your donation, whereas the total
amount cannot become negative.
You can stop the task at any time by clicking the button “Stop task” in the bottom right
corner of the screen.
In total, you can solve up to 25 tasks. For this, you have a maximum of 20 minutes.
Your decision concerning your amount of work and the generated donation will be con-
trolled by your observer. Additionally, after finishing the tasks, you will inform your ob-
server in person about the total amount of your donation.
Click “Continue” to start with the tasks.
Screen 3 – Task
So far, you have generated a total donation of X. For correctly solving this task your do-
nation increases by Y Cents.
For a wrong answer, 5 Cents will be subtracted.
Count all zeros in the following table.
Screen 4 – Results
You solved X tasks correctly and thus generated a donation of eY. We will transact this
amount for you to the project Fight against Hunger of SOS Kinderdörfer.
Please go now downstairs into the laboratory to your observer and inform him or her about
your room number and your generated donation.
Click “Continue” as soon as you are back at your desk.
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Screen 5 – End
The experiment is now over.
Written Instructions in Envelope
For your participation in today’s experiment, you receive e5. These e5 are also inside
this DIN A5 envelope. Before the experiment is finished, you have another possibility to
donate.
You can donate any part of youre5 to the Project Bolivia: Children in Poverty Districts
of SOS Kinderdörfer. We will transact the donation for you.
In the slums of La Paz, children and their families are living in poverty. Crime, alcoholism
and hopelessness are omnipresent. People do not have another possibility than to take
on irregular, precarious and merely profitable jobs. One of the main reasons for the low
income per household is the low level of education of many parents: only about 15 per-
cent hold any degree. Most mothers and fathers therefore do not have any perspective
– and the same fate threatens their children. SOS Kinderdörfer help by supporting the
parents with 30 SOS day nurseries, educational projects, microcredits and psychological
help.
You can donate any amount betweene0 ande5 in steps of 10 Cents.
Your decision is completely anonymous.
Please take the money and the small white envelope out of the DIN A5 envelope and
place the amount you want to donate inside the white envelope. Following this, close
the small envelope and leave it on your desk.
Afterwards, the experiment is over and you can leave the laboratory.
Experiment B
Screen 1 – Welcome
Welcome!
Please wait until all participants are seated.
Screen 2 – Mood
First of all, we would like to know about your current mood.
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For this purpose, please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 to 10.
0 indicates that your current mood is really bad. 10 indicates that your current mood is
really good.
You can choose any integer in between 0 to 10 to express your mood.
How is your current mood?
Screen 3 – Explanation Task
Next, in the main part of the study, you will work on a task. In this task, you will have to
press the X-button and Y-button alternately.
You now have the possibility to get to know the task by testing it for 60 seconds. By doing
so, please try to press as many correct combinations as possible.
Please pay attention to pressing the buttons alternately. Otherwise it might happen that
the combinations are not being counted.
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. If this is not the case, please
click “Continue” in order to test the task.
Screen 4 – Practice Task
Please press the X-button and the Y-button alternately.
So far, you have pressed X correct combinations.
Screen 5 – Result
The test phase is now over.
Within 60 seconds, you entered X correct key combinations. If you have any questions
concerning the task, please raise your hand. If you do not have any questions, please
click “Continue”.
Screen 6 – Information Donation
For your participation in this study, you receive e6. This amount will be paid to you in
cash at the end of the study.
In addition, you have the possibility to generate a donation for the project “Fight against
Hunger” by SOS Kinderdörfer.
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Worldwide, nearly one billion people do not have enough food. Especially children and
families are suffering from this and are therefore specifically being supported by SOS
Kinderdörfer. SOS Kinderdörfer provide a perspective to children in need and enable
parents step by step to self-help: with food, seeds and through education. Through their
SOS Family Help they are fighting against poverty and hunger around the globe, e.g. in
Bangladesh, Niger and Nicaragua.
You can generate the donation by working on the task you already got to know.
Important: your donation is completely anonymous.
Important: at the end of the experiment, we will ask you to step out of your cubicle and
inform all other participants about your name and your total generated donation.
While doing so, your generated donation will be indicated on your screen, so that all other
participants can read it as well.
You can find further details concerning the amount of donation on the next page.
After the end of the study, we will make a confirmation of the donation accessible to you.
Screen 7 – Information Piece Rate
For every correctly entered combination, we will donate a certain amount to the project
described on the previous page. This amount per combination varies with the number
of already entered combinations.
You can find the exact values in the following table:
Number of combinations Donation per combination
1–100 1 Cent
101–200 0.5 Cent
201–350 0.25 Cent
351–500 0.1 Cent
501–700 0.05 Cent
ab 701 0.01 Cent
This means that we donate 1 Cent per combination to the project for the first 100 com-
binations. For the next 100 combinations, the donation amounts to 0.5 Cents per com-
bination etc.
If you pressed, for example, 160 correct combinations we would donate 100 × 1 Cents
+60 × 0.5 Cents = 130 Cents to the project.
To start working on the task, please click “Continue”.
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Screen 8 – Task
Please press the X-button and the Y-button alternately. So far you have pressed X correct
combinations and therefore generated a donation ofeY.
Screen 9 – Result
You entered X correct key combinations and thus generated a total donation ofeY.
We will transact this amount for you to the project “Fight against Hunger” of SOS Kinderdör-
fer.
Please wait until all participants are finished with the task.
Screen 10 – Conrmation of Donation
As announced, you have the possibility to check the confirmation of donation for the
total amount of donations generated over the course of this study. For this, we will upload
a confirmation on the following website within the next couple of days, after transacting
the donations:
LINK
You can now copy the website’s address or take a picture of it.
Screen 11 – Information Donation
You now, once again, have the possibility to generate a donation. This time, we will
transact the money for you to the project “Bolivia: Children in Poverty Districts” by SOS
Kinderdörfer.
In the slums of La Paz, children and their families are living in poverty. Crime, alcoholism
and hopelessness are omnipresent. People do not have any other possibility than to take
on irregular, precarious and merely profitable jobs. One of the main reasons for the low
income per household is the low level of education of many parents: only about 15 per-
cent hold any degree. Most mothers and fathers therefore do not have any perspective
– and the same fate threatens their children. SOS Kinderdörfer help by supporting the
parents with 30 SOS day nurseries, educational projects, microcredits and psychological
help.
Important: your donation is completely anonymous. Important: in contrast to the
first donation you will not have to inform anyone about your donation. Your second
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donation is completely anonymous. However, you will have to announce your first do-
nation to all other participants of the experiment hereafter!
You can generate the donation by working on the same task as before. Also, the amount
of donation per combination does not change and will be shown to you once again on
the next page.
After the end of the study, we will make a confirmation of the donation accessible to
you. This confirmation will also be provided on the website to which you have already
received the link.
Screen 12 – Reminder Piece Rate
Here, you can, once again, see the amount of donation for every entered combination:
Number of combinations Donation per combination
1–100 1 Cent
101–200 0.5 Cent
201–350 0.25 Cent
351–500 0.1 Cent
501–700 0.05 Cent
ab 701 0.01 Cent
To start working on the task, please click “Continue”.
Screen 13 – Task
Please press the X-button and Y-button alternately. So far you have pressed X correct
combinations and therefore generated a donation ofeY.
Screen 14 – Result
You entered X correct key combinations and thus generated a donation ofeY.
We will transact this amount for you to the project “Bolivia: Children in Poverty Districts”
of SOS Kinderdörfer.
Please wait until all participants are finished with the task.
Screen 15 – Mood
We now once again would like to know about your current mood.
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For this purpose, please indicate your answer on a scale of 0 to 10.
0 indicates that your current mood is really bad. 10 indicates that your current mood is
really good.
You can choose any integer in between 0 to 10 to express your mood.
How is your current mood?
Screen 16 – Announcement (Private-Private)
In the following, some of the other participants (you are not part of them) will stand up
and announce their names as well as their generated donation of part 1. These partici-
pants already knew about this while making their decision.
We ask you to stay seated inside your cubicle during this time, and to open your curtain
when we ask you to do so.
After this part is finished, we will start with the payment. Please stay seated inside your
cubicle until we call your cubicle number.
Screen 16 – Announcement (Public-Private)
As announced, before this study is over, you will now inform the other participants on
your generated donation from Part 1. For this, we will ask you to stand up and stand in
front of your cubicle, whereas the curtain is open.
Some of the other participants will also step out of their cubicle at the same time. You
will then sequentially state your first names and your generated donations from part 1.
We ask you to be silent until your turn and to say the following sentence when requested
to do so:
My name is ___ and I generated a donation of ___ Euros in part 1.
As a reminder, you will see the amount of your donation from Part 1 on the next page.
Please click “Continue”, check the amount of your donation, and step out of the cubicle
when we ask you to do so.
Screen 17 – Announcement (Public-Private)
My name is ___ and I generated a donation of ___ Euros in part 1.
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4.B Screenshots
Experiment A
Figure 4.6: Screenshot of real-effort task Counting Zeros for Experiment A
Experiment B
Figure 4.7: Screenshot of real-effort task Click for Charity for Experiment B
